Neelabh Gupta v. Purshottam Das Gupta and 2 Others, 2026

The proceedings were registered as Rent Case No. 10460 of 2025, and the Rent Authority allowed the case by an order dated 2 September 2025.

The tenants challenged that order by filing Rent Appeal No. 99 of 2026 before the Additional District Judge, Court No. 9, Kanpur Nagar. Along with the appeal, they filed an application seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and an application for interim protection.

While the matter was pending, steps pursuant to the Rent Authority's order continued, including issuance of an Amin Parwana on 25 March 2026. The Appellate Court subsequently granted interim protection because, without protection, the appeal might effectively become infructuous. 

The landlord challenged the interim protection before the Allahabad High Court, arguing principally that the appellate court should not have granted protection while the application for condonation of delay remained undecided.

The landlord also relied upon a Mediation Centre report dated 24 February 2026, but the High Court noted that this report had not been placed before the Appellate Court when it granted interim protection. 

The Allahabad High Court declined to interfere with the interim protection granted by the Appellate Court.

The Court held that the mere fact that an application seeking condonation of delay was pending did not deprive the Appellate Court of its power to issue a protective interim order where such protection was necessary to preserve the subject matter of the appeal.

The Court made an important distinction between:

preserving the subject matter of an appeal, and

entertaining or deciding the appeal on merits.

The interim protection in this case was considered provisional and protective. It did not amount to condonation of the delay or a finding that the appeal was maintainable. 

The Court also held that the Mediation Centre report could not be used to establish an error in the Appellate Court's decision because the report had not been brought to the Appellate Court's attention when its order was passed.

The High Court emphasized that its jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory, not appellate, and therefore it would not substitute its own view merely because another view might have been possible. 

Ultimately, the petition was disposed of, with directions to the Rent Tribunal/Appellate Court to consider the delay-condonation application at the earliest and thereafter proceed with the appeal expeditiously.

The Court directed that the proceedings should preferably be concluded within 60 days from presentation of a certified copy of the High Court's order, subject to legal impediments and cooperation of the parties. 

The Court recognized that if the subject matter of an appeal is irreversibly altered while the limitation issue is being considered, the eventual appellate remedy could become meaningless. Therefore, an appellate court may preserve the existing position temporarily.

The judgment carefully separates two judicial functions:

First: deciding whether sufficient grounds exist to condone the delay.

Second: temporarily protecting the subject matter while that question is pending.

Granting protection does not prejudge the first question.

The High Court reiterated that Article 227 confers supervisory jurisdiction rather than ordinary appellate jurisdiction.

Consequently, the High Court will not interfere merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. Interference requires something more serious, such as:

perversity;

arbitrariness;

manifest unreasonableness; or

jurisdictional error.

The landlord relied on the Mediation Centre report dated 24 February 2026. However, that document had not been presented to the Appellate Court when the interim protection was granted.

The High Court therefore held that the legality of the Appellate Court's discretionary decision had to be examined on the basis of the material that was actually before that court at the relevant time.

This is an important procedural principle because parties generally cannot establish a jurisdictional error by relying retrospectively on material that the original decision-maker never had an opportunity to consider.

Although the High Court upheld the interim protection, it recognized that the delay-condonation application could not remain pending indefinitely.

Accordingly, the Court directed the Appellate Court to address the limitation issue promptly and then proceed with the appeal in accordance with law, keeping Section 33(2) of the 2021 Act in view.