Latest JudgementCode of Civil Procedure, 1908

Madan Mohan (Dead) Through LRs. v. Thakar Dass (Dead) Thr. LRs., 2026

Bona Fide Requirement & Revisional Jurisdiction in Rent Matters

Supreme Court of India·26 September 2026
Madan Mohan (Dead) Through LRs. v. Thakar Dass (Dead) Thr. LRs., 2026
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Judgement Details

Court

Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision

26 September 2026

Judges

Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih

Citation

Acts / Provisions

Section 13, East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13(2)(i), East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13(3)(a)(ii), East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Facts of the Case

  • Kamla Devi, the original landlady, instituted eviction proceedings against Thakar Dass, the tenant, under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

  • The eviction petition was based on two grounds: non-payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the premises for herself and her son Madan Mohan.

  • The tenancy was undisputed and the rent was ₹112.50 per month.

  • The tenant had tendered the arrears of rent, along with ₹1,000 interest and ₹1,100 costs, making a total tender of ₹8,740, which was accepted. Consequently, the arrears issue was decided in favour of the tenant.

  • The tenant disputed the alleged bona fide requirement, contending, among other things, that the landlady already had other shops and that one of them was available.

  • The Rent Controller, Nabha, nevertheless found the landlord's case proved and ordered eviction on 27 May 2010.

  • The Appellate Authority, Patiala, affirmed the decision on 6 January 2011. It noted that although Kamla Devi died during the proceedings, the requirement also extended to her son Madan Mohan and therefore survived.

  • The Punjab and Haryana High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, reversed the concurrent findings on 6 August 2018. The High Court considered that Kamla Devi had not properly disclosed the existence of a third shop and therefore had not approached the court with clean hands.

  • The legal representatives of Madan Mohan thereafter approached the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the landlord had established a genuine and bona fide requirement of the demised shop under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

  2. Whether the existence of another shop, allegedly being used for storing waste material, defeated the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement.

  3. Whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, was justified in interfering with the concurrent factual findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority.

  4. Whether the High Court correctly concluded that the landlady had concealed the availability of another shop and therefore had not approached the court with clean hands.

  5. Whether the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority regarding bona fide requirement were perverse or legally unsustainable.

Judgement

  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 6 August 2018.

  • The Court held that the High Court had exceeded the permissible limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by effectively reconsidering the factual findings concerning the availability and use of the third shop.

  • The Supreme Court relied upon established principles governing bona fide requirement. It explained that a landlord's requirement must be genuine, honest and real, rather than a mere desire or pretext to evict a tenant. At the same time, once the requirement is objectively found to be bona fide, the landlord's choice of accommodation should ordinarily receive due respect.

  • The Court further observed that the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority had concurrently found that the third shop was being used for storing waste material. Since this was a factual finding, the High Court could not simply substitute its own appreciation of the evidence in revision merely because another interpretation was possible.

  • Set aside the High Court's judgment.

  • Restored and affirmed the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority.

  • Directed the respondents to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the demised shop within two months from the date of the Supreme Court judgment.

  • Allowed the appeal.

  • Made no order as to costs.

Held

  • The Supreme Court held that the High Court had improperly interfered with concurrent factual findings while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC.

  • The Court reaffirmed two important principles:

  • Bona fide requirement means a genuine, sincere and objectively ascertainable need, not a mere whim, desire or pretext.

  • Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited. A High Court cannot ordinarily reappreciate evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for concurrent findings of subordinate courts unless there is perversity, jurisdictional error, procedural illegality or non-consideration of material evidence.

  • Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the eviction order and directed the tenant to surrender possession of the shop within two months. 

Analysis

  • The judgment reinforces that bona fide requirement is more than a landlord's mere desire to obtain possession. The requirement must represent a real, sincere and honest need. The Court referred to Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta and Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini while explaining this principle.

  • The Court emphasized that the question of bona fide requirement cannot be determined through a rigid mathematical formula. Courts must examine the circumstances realistically and avoid approaches that are either excessively liberal, excessively restrictive or overly technical.

  • Once the landlord's requirement is objectively established, courts should generally respect the landlord's choice of the accommodation most suitable for the established need. The judiciary should not unnecessarily substitute its own preference for that of the landlord.

  • This is one of the most significant aspects of the judgment. The Supreme Court relied upon Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v. Tuffail Mohammed, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh and Ambadas Khanduji Shinde v. Ashok Sadashiv Mamurkar to reiterate that revisional jurisdiction is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction.

  • The High Court may interfere where findings are perverse, where material evidence has not been considered, or where there is a jurisdictional/procedural illegality. But merely because another view of the evidence is possible does not justify interference under Section 115 CPC.

  • The High Court treated the existence of the third shop as significant because it considered that Kamla Devi had concealed it and therefore had not approached the court with clean hands. The Supreme Court, however, focused on the factual findings already reached by the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority: the third shop was being used for storing waste material.

  • The Supreme Court considered that the High Court had effectively reappreciated the evidence while exercising revision, which was beyond the normal scope of Section 115 CPC.

  • The Court placed the dispute within the broader purpose of rent-control legislation, which historically seeks to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction while also recognizing legitimate rights of landlords. The judgment therefore reflects the need to balance tenant protection with a landlord's legitimate and proven need for possession.

  • The decision is particularly useful for understanding the relationship between rent-control law and civil revisional jurisdiction. It confirms that a High Court exercising revision cannot ordinarily transform the proceeding into a fresh factual appeal. Where two subordinate authorities have reached concurrent findings supported by the record, intervention requires a legally recognized ground for revision rather than simply a different appreciation of evidence.