Vijayalakshmi R. v. C. L. Balaji, 2026

Their son, Aarav C. Balaji, was born on 20.03.2006.

The parties began living separately from 13.09.2011.

They jointly filed proceedings under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking divorce by mutual consent.

On 29.08.2015, the parties entered into a Settlement Petition, which was incorporated into the decree dissolving their marriage.

Clause 8 provided for payment of ₹2.20 crore by the husband towards maintenance of the minor son, in specified instalments.

Clause 9 provided for payment of 20% of the husband's annual income, including salary, bonus, stock options and other employment income, towards the son's maintenance, education and other expenses.

Clause 10 stated that after payment of ₹1 crore, the husband would not be required to pay any further amount towards maintenance and would thereafter pay the balance ₹1.20 crore.

The entire ₹2.20 crore under Clause 8 was ultimately paid, with the last payment made on 28.07.2017. 

In 2022, the wife filed Execution Petition No. 30 of 2022, seeking enforcement of Clause 9 and payment of 20% of the husband's annual income with interest.

The Family Court dismissed the execution petition, holding that Clause 9 had ceased to operate after payment of ₹1 crore under Clause 10.

The Karnataka High Court affirmed that decision.

The wife therefore approached the Supreme Court, contending that Clause 9 was an independent and continuing obligation. 

The Court interpreted Clauses 8, 9 and 10 together, rather than treating them as three independent obligations.

Clause 8 established the overall lump-sum maintenance arrangement of ₹2.20 crore.

Clause 9 provided an interim income-linked mechanism for maintenance of the son while the lump-sum amount was being arranged and paid.

Clause 10 provided the point at which that interim obligation would cease.

Once ₹1 crore had been paid, the obligation to pay 20% of annual income under Clause 9 ceased.

The remaining ₹1.20 crore under Clause 8 was subsequently payable, and the entire ₹2.20 crore was ultimately paid.

The Court emphasized that an executing court cannot go behind the decree or create a fresh obligation different from the terms of the concluded settlement.

The Court also noted that the parties' subsequent conduct supported this interpretation. The wife did not demand the 20% annual-income payment for nearly five years after the final settlement payment, and she had acknowledged receipt of the ₹2.20 crore settlement amount.

Regarding higher education, the Court declined to create a new ₹6–6.5 crore corpus under Article 142, because doing so would effectively rewrite a settlement that had already been performed.

However, the Court recorded that the husband had voluntarily deposited ₹1 crore into the son's account for higher education and had relinquished any right to seek its reimbursement. The amount was directed to remain available exclusively for the son's educational expenses. 

The Court characterized the 20% income-linked payment as an interim mechanism intended to operate while the lump-sum settlement was being paid, rather than as a perpetual obligation continuing alongside the ₹2.20 crore settlement.

The Court applied the established principle of contractual/instrument interpretation that an interpretation making an express provision redundant or otiose should ordinarily be avoided.

The original 2013 arrangement contemplated 20% of annual income for the son's maintenance and education. The 2015 Settlement Petition replaced that arrangement with a defined ₹2.20 crore capital settlement. This history supported the conclusion that the parties had consciously moved from an open-ended arrangement to a final lump-sum settlement.

The Court considered the parties' subsequent conduct relevant to understanding their common interpretation of the settlement. The absence of a demand for 20% annual income for several years, acknowledgment of receipt of ₹2.20 crore and other conduct reinforced the interpretation adopted by the lower courts.

An executing court is not permitted to go behind the decree. Its task is to enforce the decree according to its actual terms, rather than create a new or enlarged obligation.

The Court distinguished authorities concerning a parent's general obligation to maintain a dependent child. Such general principles could not be used in execution proceedings to revive an obligation that had already been discharged under a consent decree.

The Family Court and High Court had reached concurrent conclusions. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Article 136, it does not ordinarily interfere merely because another interpretation is possible; interference requires circumstances such as perversity, manifest error or misreading of material.

Although Article 142 confers broad powers to do complete justice, the Court held that those powers could not be used in this case to recast an already performed settlement or impose a new maintenance obligation through execution proceedings.

The Court clarified that the lower courts had not dismissed the execution petition as time-barred. The reference to the passage of time was relevant only as evidence concerning the parties' understanding of the settlement, not as a finding that the execution petition was barred by limitation.

The judgment demonstrates that where parties voluntarily settle matrimonial and maintenance claims through a consent decree, courts will closely examine the language of the settlement, its structure, surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct before determining whether a particular payment obligation survives.