Latest JudgementInformation Technology Act, 2000

Maharaj Saran v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2026

Section 66 IT Act Is Bailable: Supreme Court Clarifies Role of Section 77B

Supreme Court of India·26 September 2026

Court

Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision

26 September 2026

Judges

Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Citation

Acts / Provisions

Section 66, 72, 84-C, 77B and 78(1)(ii), Information Technology Act, 2000

Facts of the Case

The appellant, Maharaj Saran, approached the Court concerning the detention of his son.
The appellant's son was detained at an airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular issued on 13 December 2024. The LOC was connected with FIR No. 07/2024, registered on 7 November 2024 at the Cyber Crime Police Station, Fazilka, Punjab. The FIR invoked Sections 66, 72 and 84-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with Section 78(1)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The appellant had earlier approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus for release of his son.
The High Court, while disposing of the petition on 19 December 2024, observed that Section 66 of the IT Act had not been defined as a bailable offence under the Act. It nevertheless directed that the concerned Magistrate should consider the detainee's bail application expeditiously.
The appellant challenged this particular observation before the Supreme Court.

Whether an offence punishable under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is bailable or non-bailable.
Whether Section 77B of the Information Technology Act must be read along with Section 66 for determining the nature of the offence.
Whether the Punjab & Haryana High Court was correct in observing that Section 66 had not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act.
Whether the High Court's observation concerning the bailability of Section 66 required interference by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that Section 66 of the IT Act had not been defined as a bailable offence.
The Supreme Court specifically held that the High Court had failed to take into consideration Section 77B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which must be read to determine the nature of an offence under Section 66.
Section 66 prescribes punishment extending up to three years. Section 77B provides that an offence punishable with imprisonment of three years shall be bailable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court clarified the legal position concerning the bailability of the Section 66 offence.
The appeal was consequently disposed of, and pending applications were also disposed of.

The Supreme Court held that Section 77B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 must be read with Section 66 to determine the nature of the offence.
Since Section 66 carries punishment of up to three years, Section 77B makes the offence bailable. The High Court's contrary observation was therefore set aside.

The central significance of the decision is the Supreme Court's insistence that Section 66 cannot be examined in isolation when determining whether the offence is bailable.
Section 66 prescribes punishment of up to three years for computer-related offences. Section 77B specifically addresses the classification of offences under the IT Act and states that an offence punishable with three years' imprisonment is bailable.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court had focused on the fact that Section 66 itself did not expressly describe the offence as "bailable." The Supreme Court found that this approach failed to consider the separate statutory provision contained in Section 77B.
The judgment therefore demonstrates the principle that different provisions of the same statute must be read together when determining the legal character and consequences of an offence.
The decision is particularly relevant to cyber-crime investigations, because classification as bailable or non-bailable directly affects the accused's procedural position and access to bail.
The case also illustrates the importance of carefully distinguishing between the substantive offence under Section 66 and the procedural classification supplied by Section 77B.
The Supreme Court's intervention was limited to the legal issue concerning the interpretation of Section 66 read with Section 77B; the order did not constitute a final adjudication of the underlying allegations in the FIR.