X and Another v. State of Punjab and Others, 2026

The petitioners were a young couple who claimed to be in a consensual live-in relationship.

They approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking protection from alleged harassment and threats from their relatives.

The petitioners asserted that they had left their respective parental homes and were residing together.

They claimed that their relationship was opposed by their relatives and that they apprehended interference and harassment.

The petitioners also alleged that the respondents threatened to separate them and could implicate one of them in false criminal cases.

A representation had been submitted before the Superintendent of Police, Patiala, seeking protection.

The petitioners contended that both were major and that their relationship was consensual.

They further stated that they intended to solemnize their marriage in the future.

However, an important factual circumstance was that petitioner No. 2, the male partner, had not yet attained the legally prescribed marriageable age.

The couple therefore sought police protection so that they could continue residing together peacefully.

The State opposed the grant of the requested protection.

The Court examined whether the circumstances disclosed a legally recognizable live-in relationship capable of attracting the protection sought under Article 21.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, particularly the requirements concerning legal age and qualification to enter into a legal marriage.

The Court also considered whether merely living together for a short period, coupled with a bare assertion that the parties were in a live-in relationship, was sufficient to establish the relationship for purposes of the requested judicial protection.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the petition seeking police protection.

Justice Sandeep Moudgil examined the legal requirements relating to a relationship in the nature of marriage with reference to D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal.

The Court noted that one of the petitioners had not attained the legally prescribed marriageable age.

The Court treated this circumstance as significant because one of the requirements referred to in D. Velusamy is that the parties should be of legal age to marry or otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage.

The Court further observed that the petitioners had been living together only for a short period.

According to the Court, merely residing together for a few days and making a bare assertion that the parties were in a live-in relationship was insufficient to establish the kind of legally recognizable relationship contemplated by the precedent relied upon.

The Court therefore declined to issue the requested direction requiring police authorities to protect the relationship.

The Court stated that the constitutional guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 operates within the framework of law.

The Court also made observations concerning the dignity and reputation of parents and the social consequences of the petitioners leaving their parental homes.

The judgment referred to the importance traditionally attached to marriage and observed that Indian society contains diverse traditions, customs and beliefs.

The Court expressed concern that indiscriminate grant of protection in circumstances not satisfying the requirements identified by precedent could have broader social consequences.

The Court concluded that the petitioners had failed to establish a case warranting interference.

The petition seeking protection was accordingly dismissed.

Central reasoning: The Court's reasoning turned substantially on the distinction between merely living together and establishing a relationship satisfying the legal characteristics identified in D. Velusamy. The judgment treated legal eligibility to marry as an important consideration.

Importance of marriageable age: The most significant factual circumstance was that the male petitioner had not reached the legally prescribed marriageable age. The Court regarded this as a substantial obstacle to the protection sought on the asserted legal basis.

Velusamy precedent: In D. Velusamy, the Supreme Court was dealing specifically with the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the domestic-violence statutory framework. It identified several characteristics relevant to such a relationship, including legal age, qualification to marry, holding out as spouses and significant cohabitation.

Scope of the precedent: The judgment applies the Velusamy criteria in assessing the couple's claim for protection. However, it is important not to read the case as establishing that every consensual relationship between adults is unlawful merely because it does not satisfy every characteristic of a “relationship in the nature of marriage.” The Supreme Court's formulation arose in the context of determining eligibility under the domestic-violence framework.

Short duration of cohabitation: The Court considered the petitioners' assertion that they had been living together for only a few days insufficient, by itself, to establish the requisite legally recognizable relationship.

Article 21: Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, but the Court did not accept that the constitutional provision automatically required the police to provide protection for the particular relationship asserted by these petitioners.

Protection petition versus determination of relationship: The case illustrates the importance of the factual and legal basis on which a couple seeks police protection. A protection petition is not necessarily an occasion for the High Court to conclusively determine all questions concerning the legal status of a relationship.

Parental dignity observations: The Court made observations linking Article 21 with the dignity and reputation of parents. This is a notable aspect of the judgment because Article 21 is ordinarily invoked to protect the liberty and dignity of the individual approaching the Court. The Court's reasoning therefore placed the petitioners' asserted liberty alongside its stated concern regarding parental dignity.

Social considerations: The Court referred to Indian traditions, marriage as a socially significant institution, and concerns regarding the “social fabric.” These observations formed part of the Court's reasoning in declining the requested protection.

Constitutional-law tension: The judgment raises a broader legal question concerning the relationship between individual autonomy under Article 21 and judicial consideration of family reputation and social norms. The judgment itself resolves the particular protection application on the facts before it; it should not automatically be treated as a general declaration that consensual cohabitation by adults is prohibited.

Legal significance: The decision is significant for protection petitions involving young couples because it demonstrates that the High Court may examine not merely whether two people are living together, but also the factual and legal circumstances relied upon to characterize their relationship.

Distinction from general live-in jurisprudence: Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence has recognized that live-in relationships and consensual adult relationships can attract legal protection in appropriate circumstances. At the same time, Velusamy makes clear that not every live-in relationship automatically qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for every statutory purpose.

Practical implication: A person seeking protection should establish the factual foundation of the claimed relationship and the precise legal basis for the protection sought. The judgment shows that a bare assertion of cohabitation may not be sufficient in every case.

Overall principle: On the facts reported, the Court declined to grant protection because the relationship did not satisfy the legal circumstances that the Court considered necessary, particularly the male petitioner's age and the short period of alleged cohabitation.