Vegraj Singh and Another v. State of U.P. and Another, 2026

An FIR was registered at Police Station Izzatnagar, Bareilly concerning allegations under Sections 376(2)(n), 504 and 506 IPC and provisions of the SC/ST Act.

Vegraj Singh and Daulat, who were the father and elder brother of the principal accused, were named in the FIR.

After investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet against the principal accused alone and exonerated Vegraj Singh and Daulat.

During the subsequent trial, the victim appeared as PW-1.

In her examination-in-chief, the victim alleged that the appellants had abused her and had used the caste-related word “Chamar”.

On the basis of this deposition, the Special Judge under the SC/ST Act summoned the appellants under Section 319 CrPC by an order dated 21 March 2025.

The appellants challenged the summoning order before the Allahabad High Court.

They argued that the victim's earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC did not attribute any specific role to them concerning caste-based abuse, intimidation or other alleged criminal acts.

They further argued that the principal allegations concerning rape and the alleged promise of marriage were directed against the principal accused alone.

The prosecution opposed the appeal and argued that the victim had consistently referred to the appellants' involvement.

It was submitted that the question of whether the alleged caste-related utterance carried the requisite intention was a matter for trial.

The High Court examined whether the evidence available at the stage of Section 319 CrPC was sufficiently strong to justify summoning the appellants.

The Court also examined whether the alleged use of the word “Chamar”, without additional material demonstrating the requisite caste-based intention, satisfied the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the summoning order passed against the appellants.

The Court held that the mere use of the word “Chamar”, by itself, does not establish the requisite intention or knowledge to insult or humiliate a person because of their membership of an SC/ST community.

The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Swaran Singh v. State and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand.

The Court observed that the statutory provisions require more than the mere existence of an abusive or offensive utterance.

The necessary element of intentional caste-based insult or humiliation must be prima facie apparent from the material.

The Court found that no specific caste-related word had been attributed to either appellant in the victim's earlier Section 161 statement.

It also found that no distinct role concerning abuse or criminal intimidation had been assigned to either appellant in the relevant earlier statements.

The Court then examined the legal threshold applicable to Section 319 CrPC.

Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court emphasised that Section 319 confers an extraordinary power which must be exercised sparingly and cautiously.

The Court noted that the evidence required for summoning an additional accused under Section 319 must be stronger than the ordinary prima facie threshold applicable at the stage of framing charges.

The Court concluded that the material before the trial court did not contain sufficiently reliable evidence establishing the appellants' complicity.

The trial court was therefore found to have exercised its Section 319 jurisdiction in a casual and cavalier manner.

The summoning order dated 21 March 2025 was set aside.

The appeal was accordingly allowed. 

Caste-based intent is essential: The judgment emphasises that the SC/ST Act does not criminalise every use of a caste name in every circumstance. For the relevant provisions to apply, the statutory requirement of intentional insult, intimidation or humiliation on the ground of caste must be satisfied.

Word alone is not determinative: The Court distinguished the use of a caste name from the context and intention accompanying its use. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate the legally required caste-based insult.

Protection against overbroad application: The ruling prevents the relevant provisions from being invoked mechanically merely because a caste-related word appears in the evidence.

Importance of context: Whether an expression constitutes a caste-based insult depends upon the circumstances, manner of use, surrounding conduct and the apparent intention or knowledge of the person using it.

Section 319 has a high threshold: The judgment reinforces that Section 319 is not an ordinary procedural mechanism for adding anyone whose name appears during trial. The power is extraordinary and requires substantially stronger material.

Hardeep Singh principle: The Court followed the Constitution Bench's approach that the evidence required for summoning an additional accused must cross a higher threshold than the ordinary prima facie assessment applicable at the charge stage.

Investigation material remains relevant: Although a person may be summoned on the basis of evidence emerging during trial, the Court considered it significant that the appellants had been exonerated during investigation and that earlier witness statements did not assign them specific roles.

Examination-in-chief alone: A bare or general allegation appearing for the first time or in an expanded form during examination-in-chief cannot automatically justify exercising Section 319 jurisdiction without examining its reliability and consistency with the overall material.

Specific role required: The Court found an absence of a specific, distinct or sufficient role attributable to the appellants. This weakened the basis for summoning them to face trial.

Distinction between trial and summoning: The prosecution's argument that intention could ultimately be decided at trial did not remove the requirement that the statutory threshold for summoning under Section 319 must first be satisfied.

Balancing competing interests: The judgment attempts to balance the protection provided by the SC/ST Act against the equally important principle that individuals should not be subjected to criminal trial without sufficiently strong material connecting them to the alleged offence.

Practical significance: The ruling is important for Section 319 applications because it reiterates that summoning an additional accused is a serious judicial step, not a routine consequence of a witness mentioning that person's name during testimony.

BNSS relevance: Section 358 BNSS now contains the corresponding power to summon additional accused. The principles governing the exercise of that power remain important under the new procedural framework.