Union of India v. Preeti Vaid & Anr., 2026

The respondent suffered from Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and low vision in both eyes.

She possessed a disability certificate issued by the competent authority under the RPWD Act, certifying:

• 15% disability due to low vision.

• 30% disability due to multiple sclerosis.

• Overall disability of 40%, qualifying her as a person with benchmark disability.

She applied for the Combined Graduate Level Examination (CGLE) 2021 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) under the Persons with Disabilities (PwD) reservation category.

The respondent successfully cleared all stages of the recruitment process and was called for document verification.

SSC rejected her candidature stating that "Multiple Sclerosis Disease not admissible for reservation."

She challenged the rejection before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

The CAT directed SSC to appoint her under the PwD quota.

SSC challenged the CAT's order before the Delhi High Court, contending that multiple sclerosis was not covered under Section 34 of the RPWD Act for reservation purposes.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India and SSC.

The Court upheld the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal directing appointment of the respondent under the PwD quota.

It held that Multiple Sclerosis is expressly recognized under Clause 4(a)(i) of the Schedule to the RPWD Act as a chronic neurological condition.

Consequently, Multiple Sclerosis is a "specified disability" under Section 2(z)(c) of the RPWD Act.

Since the respondent had an overall disability of 40%, she qualified as a person with benchmark disability under Section 2(r).

The Court held that the first part of Section 34(1) creates a statutory obligation to reserve at least 4% vacancies for persons with benchmark disabilities, while the second part merely distributes that reservation among different categories.

It ruled that the latter part of Section 34(1) cannot be interpreted in a manner that narrows or defeats the broader right created by the first part.

The Court observed that the RPWD Act is a beneficial legislation and must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation.

The Court further held that SSC could not ignore or question a disability certificate validly issued by the competent authority under the RPWD Act.

It also noted that SSC's own recruitment notification specifically recognized Multiple Sclerosis as an eligible disability for reservation.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

The Court emphasized that Section 34 should not be interpreted narrowly, as doing so would undermine the legislative objective of promoting equal opportunities for persons with disabilities.

The decision strengthens the legal sanctity of disability certificates issued by competent statutory authorities by holding that recruiting agencies cannot independently question or disregard such certificates.

By relying upon Vikash Kumar, Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal, and In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, the Court reaffirmed that disability rights legislation must be interpreted expansively in favour of inclusion rather than exclusion.

The judgment also highlights the principle that government authorities must act consistently with their own recruitment notifications and cannot subsequently deny benefits expressly promised therein.

The ruling significantly strengthens employment rights of persons suffering from chronic neurological disorders such as Multiple Sclerosis and advances the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination.