Srikanta Paul v. Purshottam Lal Sanganeria (HUF) & Ors., 2026

The appellant's grandfather, Hemanta, was inducted as a tenant in the suit premises in 1910.

After Hemanta's death, the tenancy devolved upon his son, Tapan, who was the appellant's father.

Tapan continued as the tenant during the relevant period before the enactment of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

Tapan died in 2009.

Following his father's death, the appellant, Srikanta Paul, claimed tenancy rights in the premises.

The appellant argued that because the original tenancy had originated in 1910, long before the 1997 Act came into force, his tenancy rights should not be affected by the restrictions contained in Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act.

The appellant relied upon the Supreme Court's judgment in Rajesh Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd. in support of his contention.

The landlords instituted proceedings seeking the appellant's eviction from the suit premises.

The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Calcutta, contending that the suit should have been instituted before the Presidency Small Causes Court under Section 12A read with Schedule IV of the 1997 Act.

The appellant further argued that he should be treated as a tenant at sufferance, rather than as a trespasser, after the expiry of the statutory period.

The appellant also relied upon rent receipts issued in the name of his sole proprietorship after his father's death.

According to him, the acceptance of rent demonstrated that the landlords had recognized him as an independent tenant.

The landlords disputed the existence of any fresh tenancy in favour of the appellant.

The City Civil Court ultimately passed an eviction decree against the appellant on 29 June 2024.

The appellant challenged that decree before the Calcutta High Court in FA No. 204 of 2024.

The Division Bench examined whether the appellant had acquired tenancy rights protected under the 1997 Act and whether the City Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the eviction proceedings.

The Calcutta High Court dismissed FA No. 204 of 2024 filed by Srikanta Paul.

The Division Bench upheld the 29 June 2024 judgment and decree passed by the Sixth Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta.

The Court held that the appellant's own tenancy rights accrued only upon the death of his father in 2009.

Since those rights accrued after the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 had already come into force, the appellant's succession was governed by Section 2(g) of the Act.

The Court rejected the argument that the 1910 origin of the original tenancy automatically protected the appellant from the statutory restrictions of the 1997 Act.

The Bench distinguished Rajesh Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., observing that in that case the tenancy had devolved upon the heirs before the 1997 Act came into force.

In the present case, the appellant's tenancy rights accrued only in 2009, and therefore the statutory restriction under Section 2(g) applied to him.

The Court held that the appellant's father had to be treated as the relevant original tenant for determining the appellant's succession.

Consequently, the appellant's statutory tenancy protection expired after the prescribed five-year period following his father's death.

Once that period expired, the appellant could no longer claim the status of a tenant under the 1997 Act for purposes of invoking Section 12A.

The Court held that whether the appellant was described technically as a trespasser or a tenant at sufferance was immaterial to the jurisdictional question.

The decisive question was whether he continued to fall within the statutory definition of “tenant” under Section 2(g).

Since he no longer possessed that statutory status, Section 12A did not apply to the eviction suit.

The Court therefore held that the City Civil Court at Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the landlord's suit.

The Court also rejected the appellant's reliance on rent receipts issued in the name of his sole proprietorship.

Mere acceptance of rent after expiry of a tenancy does not automatically create a fresh tenancy.

The appellant was required to produce positive evidence of the landlords' intention and consent to create a new tenancy in his favour.

No such positive evidence was found on the record.

The Court further noted that the rent receipts relied upon by the appellant had been issued during the five-year statutory moratorium following his father's death.

Therefore, those receipts could not establish that the landlords had recognized an independent tenancy in the appellant after expiry of the statutory protection.

The Division Bench concluded that the appellant had failed to establish any sustainable basis for interfering with the eviction decree.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Any interim orders were vacated, with no order as to costs.

Focus on the date of succession: The key legal distinction drawn by the Court was between the date on which the original tenancy began and the date on which the particular heir acquired his own tenancy rights. Although the tenancy began in 1910, the appellant's own succession occurred in 2009.

Prospective application of Section 2(g): The Court did not treat Section 2(g) as retrospectively destroying an already vested tenancy right. Instead, it applied the provision to the appellant's tenancy because that right arose after the 1997 Act was already in force.

Rajesh Mitra distinguished: The appellant's reliance on Rajesh Mitra failed because the factual situation was materially different. In Rajesh Mitra, the tenancy had already devolved upon the heirs before the 1997 Act commenced. Here, the relevant succession occurred in 2009.

Five-year statutory protection: The judgment emphasizes that succession to a tenancy under the 1997 Act is not necessarily perpetual. The statute imposes a limited period of protection, after which the successor may cease to qualify as a tenant.

Section 12A protection: The Court treated Section 12A as a provision whose operation depends upon the defendant actually being a tenant within the statutory framework. Once that status ceased, the appellant could not invoke the jurisdictional mechanism applicable to suits against tenants.

Tenant at sufferance argument: The Court declined to make the technical classification of the occupant decisive. Whether the appellant was called a tenant at sufferance or a trespasser did not change the fact that he no longer satisfied the statutory definition relevant to Section 12A.

City Civil Court jurisdiction: Since Section 12A did not apply, the appellant could not insist that the eviction suit be brought before the Presidency Small Causes Court. The Court therefore upheld the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court.

Acceptance of rent: The decision reinforces the principle that mere acceptance of rent does not necessarily create a fresh tenancy. There must be evidence showing the landlord's intention and consent to establish a new contractual tenancy.

Rent receipts: The timing of the receipts was particularly significant. They were issued within the statutory five-year period after the father's death, so they could not demonstrate that a new tenancy had been created after the statutory protection expired.

Burden of establishing fresh tenancy: Once the statutory tenancy had ended, the appellant needed positive evidence showing a new agreement or clear intention by the landlords to create a tenancy. The Court found no such evidence.

Interaction between statutory and contractual tenancy: The case demonstrates the difference between an inherited statutory tenancy and a fresh contractual tenancy. Continued possession or acceptance of money alone does not necessarily convert the former into the latter.

Impact on inherited tenancies: The ruling is significant for successors of long-standing tenancies because the historical origin of the tenancy does not necessarily protect every subsequent heir indefinitely. The date and circumstances of each succession matter.

Impact on eviction litigation: The decision also clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be determined merely by the occupant's historical relationship with the property. The court must examine whether the occupant presently falls within the statutory category of “tenant.”

Broader significance: The judgment prevents an occupant whose statutory tenancy has expired from obtaining continued jurisdictional protection simply by characterizing himself as a tenant at sufferance or relying upon rent receipts issued during the statutory protection period.