Sri Prince Bansal v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2026

The petitioner and the complainant were married through a court marriage on 19 July 2018, followed by a social marriage according to Hindu rites on 11 December 2019.

The parties separated in March 2020, following which the complainant initiated criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC.

Lake Town Police Station Case No. 200 of 2020 was registered and subsequently resulted in the filing of a charge sheet dated 31 January 2021.

Subsequently, the parties amicably resolved their matrimonial disputes and jointly approached the Dwarka Family Court, Delhi, seeking divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Their settlement comprehensively dealt with claims relating to maintenance, dowry, permanent alimony and stridhan.

The complainant also gave an undertaking before the Family Court that she would withdraw the pending Section 498A IPC proceeding after the mutual consent divorce was granted.

The Family Court allowed the first motion on 29 March 2023 and the second motion on 18 April 2023, thereby dissolving the marriage by mutual consent.

Despite the divorce decree and settlement, the complainant did not cooperate in bringing the pending criminal proceeding to an end.

The petitioner consequently approached the Calcutta High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the criminal revision petition and exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The Court held that a subsequent amicable settlement of matrimonial disputes followed by mutual consent divorce under Section 13-B HMA can constitute a valid and legally sustainable ground for quashing a Section 498A IPC proceeding.

The Court reiterated that although Section 498A IPC is non-compoundable, its non-compoundable character does not prevent the High Court from exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC in appropriate matrimonial cases.

The Court found that the parties had completely settled their matrimonial disputes, their marriage had been dissolved, and their financial and other matrimonial claims had been settled.

The complainant's undertaking before the Family Court to withdraw the criminal proceeding after the divorce was considered legally significant.

The Court held that a party cannot accept the benefit of a mutual consent divorce while repudiating the corresponding undertaking given before the Court.

In the circumstances, continuation of the Section 498A prosecution was held to constitute an abuse of the process of law.

The Court consequently quashed General Register Case No. 815 of 2020, arising out of Lake Town Police Station Case No. 200 of 2020, the charge sheet dated 31 January 2021 and all consequential proceedings.

The decision reinforces the distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 CrPC and quashing proceedings under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

Section 498A is non-compoundable; however, the High Court can independently examine whether continuation of a matrimonial criminal proceeding, after a genuine settlement, would amount to an abuse of process.

The judgment places considerable emphasis on the complete settlement of the matrimonial relationship. Here, the parties had not merely expressed an intention to settle; their marriage had actually been dissolved by a mutual consent decree and their financial and matrimonial claims had been settled.

The complainant's undertaking before the Family Court was an important additional circumstance. The Court treated the undertaking as having legal significance, particularly because it formed part of the circumstances in which the mutual consent divorce was obtained.

The judgment also reflects the principle that Section 482 CrPC is intended to prevent abuse of judicial process and secure the ends of justice, rather than mechanically allow criminal proceedings to continue where their underlying matrimonial dispute has completely ended.

At the same time, the ruling should not be read as establishing that every Section 498A proceeding automatically stands quashed merely because the parties subsequently obtain a divorce. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction remains dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case and the principles governing quashing of non-compoundable offences.

The decision is particularly significant where a settlement expressly provides for withdrawal of criminal proceedings and that undertaking is subsequently not honoured.

The case therefore illustrates the interaction between matrimonial settlement, mutual consent divorce, non-compoundable offences and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.