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Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal v. State of U.P., 2026

Void Second Marriage: Who Is a ‘Husband’ Under BNS?

·22 September 2026
Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal v. State of U.P., 2026
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Judgement Details

Court

Date of Decision

22 September 2026

Citation

Facts of the Case

  • The applicant, Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal, sought bail in Case Crime No. 24 of 2026, registered at Police Station Madhautanda, District Pilibhit, under Sections 85 and 80(2) BNS and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

  • The prosecution case concerned the death of the applicant's alleged second wife, who had died after consuming poison. The applicant contended that the deceased was his second wife and that the second marriage had taken place while his first wife was alive and the first marriage was subsisting.

  • According to the applicant, this made the second marriage void, and therefore he could not legally be regarded as the deceased's “husband” for purposes of Sections 80 and 85 BNS. He also submitted that there was no criminal history, the charge-sheet had already been filed, and custodial interrogation was no longer required.

  • Because this raised an important question concerning the meaning of “husband” under the new criminal-law provisions, the Court first framed a preliminary legal issue before deciding the bail application on its merits.

Issues

  1. Whether a person who contracts a second marriage during the lifetime and subsistence of his first marriage can be treated as a “husband” of the second wife under Sections 80 and 85 BNS.

  2. Whether the presumption relating to dowry death under Section 118 BSA can operate against a person whose alleged marriage with the deceased was itself void.

  3. Whether the word “husband” in penal provisions should be interpreted strictly or broadly where the alleged marriage is legally void.

  4. Whether precedents concerning Sections 498A and 304B IPC, particularly Reema Aggarwal, Shivcharan Lal Verma and P. Sivakumar, affect interpretation of the corresponding BNS provisions.

  5. Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in view of the factual circumstances, including the admitted subsistence of his first marriage, filing of the charge-sheet and absence of criminal antecedents.

Judgement

  • The Court first considered the conflicting judicial approaches regarding the expression “husband.”

  • It noted that in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, the Supreme Court had adopted a purposive interpretation of “husband” under Sections 498A and 304B IPC so that a person who entered into a marital relationship under the apparent status of husband could, in appropriate circumstances, fall within those provisions even where the marriage was legally questionable.

  • However, the Court also considered the later three-Judge Bench decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which held that where the marriage itself was null and void, prosecution under Section 498A IPC against the alleged husband was not sustainable. The Court further relied upon P. Sivakumar v. State, where the Supreme Court followed that principle.

  • The Allahabad High Court held that the larger Bench decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma must prevail over the earlier contrary approach in Reema Aggarwal. It also relied upon the principle that penal provisions must be strictly construed, particularly where two reasonable interpretations are possible.

  • The Court therefore concluded that, ordinarily, the expression “husband” under Sections 80 and 85 BNS refers to a legally married man and does not include a person whose alleged marriage itself is void.

  • The Court nevertheless identified exceptions. Where there is doubt concerning the first marriage, or where a man conceals his existing valid marriage from the second woman and induces her to live with him as his wife, he may still be treated as a “husband” for the purposes of Sections 80 and 85.

  • The Court also discussed the position under different marriage laws and observed that a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage is void under the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act, Foreign Marriage Act, Christian Marriage Act and Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act. It separately noted the position under Muslim Personal Law, where marriages within the limits permitted by Sharia law may be valid.

  • After deciding the preliminary legal question, the Court proceeded to the bail issue and allowed the bail application.

Held

The Court held, in substance, that:

 

  • The expression “husband” in Sections 80 and 85 BNS ordinarily covers a person who is legally married to the woman and does not ordinarily include a person whose alleged marriage with her is itself void.

  • The Court further held that the dowry-death presumption under Section 80 BNS read with Section 118 BSA must be strictly interpreted in accordance with the requirements of the penal statute.

  • On the facts before it, since the deceased was admitted to have been the applicant's second wife and the first wife was alive, the Court treated the second marriage as void for the purpose of the preliminary legal issue and subsequently granted the applicant bail.

  • The applicant was directed to furnish a personal bond and two sureties, subject to conditions concerning non-tampering with evidence, cooperation with the proceedings, attendance before the court and refraining from further criminal activity.

Analysis

  • A central principle in the judgment is strict interpretation of criminal statutes. The Court relied on Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay and M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer for the principle that where a penal provision reasonably permits more than one interpretation, courts should not expand criminal liability by stretching statutory language.

  • The judgment is particularly significant because it addresses the apparent tension between Reema Aggarwal and Shivcharan Lal Verma. The Allahabad High Court reasoned that the latter was a three-Judge Bench, whereas Reema Aggarwal was decided by a smaller Bench; therefore, the later larger-Bench position had to prevail. The Court also noted that P. Sivakumar subsequently relied upon Shivcharan Lal Verma.

  • The Court observed that “husband” is not specifically defined in the relevant statute and relied upon its ordinary legal meaning. On that reasoning, a legally void marriage ordinarily cannot create the legal status of husband for purposes of husband-specific penal provisions.

  • The judgment does not create an absolute rule that every person in a second marriage is outside Sections 80 and 85 BNS. The Court expressly recognized situations involving doubt about the first marriage and concealment of the existing marriage from the second wife. In the latter situation, the Court reasoned that a person should not be permitted to benefit from his own concealment or wrongdoing.

  • The ruling on the legal question formed an important part of the applicant's bail case. The Court then considered the broader bail factors, including the nature of the allegations, evidence, the applicant's alleged involvement, overcrowding of prisons, pendency of criminal cases, filing of the charge-sheet and other circumstances. It expressly stated that it was not expressing an opinion on the ultimate merits of the criminal case.

  • The decision provides an important interpretation of how the newly enacted BNS provisions corresponding to Sections 498A/304B IPC may operate where the alleged matrimonial relationship is legally void. It places particular emphasis on legally recognized marital status, strict construction of penal provisions, hierarchy of precedent and the protection of accused persons from expansion of criminal liability beyond statutory language.