Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. & 2 Others, 2026

The Family Court, Chitrakoot directed the revisionist to pay ₹2,000 per month to the woman and ₹1,000 per month to their minor daughter until she attained majority.

The woman claimed that she had married the revisionist in 2006 and thereafter lived with him as his wife.

She alleged that the revisionist subsequently subjected her and their daughter to physical harassment and stopped providing maintenance.

During cross-examination, she admitted that she had previously married another man and had two children from that marriage.

She also admitted that she had started living with the revisionist while her first husband was alive.

She further admitted that her marriage with the revisionist had not been solemnised according to Hindu rites and rituals.

The revisionist challenged the maintenance order before the Allahabad High Court.

A DNA report established that the revisionist was the biological father of the minor daughter.

The High Court partly allowed the criminal revision.

The Court set aside the maintenance awarded to the woman.

It held that the woman did not qualify as the “legally wedded wife” of the revisionist.

The Court noted that her first marriage was subsisting when she began living with the revisionist.

The subsequent relationship therefore could not confer upon her the status of a legally wedded wife.

However, the Court upheld the maintenance awarded to the minor daughter.

The DNA evidence established the biological relationship between the revisionist and the child.

The Court emphasized that a father is responsible for maintaining his child who is unable to maintain herself, irrespective of whether the child is born from a valid or invalid marital relationship.

Accordingly, the woman's maintenance was set aside, while the daughter's maintenance was maintained.

The judgment makes an important distinction between the maintenance claim of a woman and the independent maintenance rights of a child.

For claiming maintenance as a wife under Section 125 CrPC, the woman must establish the requisite legal marital relationship.

In the present case, the woman's first marriage was still subsisting when she began living with the revisionist.

Her own admissions during cross-examination also showed that the subsequent relationship had not been solemnised according to the required Hindu rites and rituals.

The Court therefore refused to recognize her as the revisionist's legally wedded wife for the purpose of Section 125 CrPC.

The decision demonstrates that long-term cohabitation alone cannot automatically create the legal status of a wife where the underlying marriage is legally invalid.

However, the Court treated the child's position differently. The daughter's right to maintenance was not made dependent upon the validity of her parents' marriage.

The DNA evidence established the revisionist's biological relationship with the child, thereby supporting the child's claim for maintenance.

Section 125(1)(b) CrPC specifically protects children who are unable to maintain themselves, including children whose parents' marital relationship may not have been legally valid.

This approach prevents a child from suffering financially because of circumstances relating to the parents' relationship.

The judgment therefore separates marital status from parental responsibility.

While the woman could not establish entitlement as a legally wedded wife, the father could not escape his obligation towards his minor daughter.

The ruling also highlights the importance of admissions made during cross-examination, particularly where those admissions directly affect the validity of a claimed marriage.

At the same time, the Court did not disturb the child's maintenance merely because the mother's claim failed.

The decision reflects the protective purpose of Section 125 CrPC, particularly in ensuring that minor children are not left without financial support.

The key legal principle is that failure to establish a valid marriage may defeat a woman's claim as a wife, but it does not defeat a minor child's independent right to maintenance from her biological father.