Sanjay Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar and Others, 2026

The petitioner, Sanjay Kumar Yadav, was a builder and Director of Bigrahpuram Developers Pvt. Ltd.

He applied for an arms licence on 17 January 2023 for a non-prohibited bore revolver/pistol.

The petitioner stated that the nature of his business required him to travel frequently during both day and night.

He claimed that, because of the nature of his professional activities and travel, he apprehended a threat to his life and property.

The police verification conducted in connection with his application was stated to be favourable.

The SHO, Jakkanpur recommended grant of the arms licence, and the recommendation was subsequently forwarded by the SSP, Patna.

Despite the favourable police recommendation, the District Magistrate, Patna rejected the application.

The principal reason relied upon for rejection was the pendency of Ramkrishna Nagar P.S. Case No. 502/2021.

The criminal case involved allegations under Sections 447, 427, 379, 354, 504, 506 and 34 IPC.

The petitioner challenged the rejection before the competent appellate authority.

The Divisional Commissioner, Patna affirmed the District Magistrate's decision.

The petitioner thereafter approached the Patna High Court.

Before the High Court, the petitioner pointed out that he had already been acquitted of the criminal charges on 23 February 2024 by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-XIII, Patna.

It was therefore argued that the criminal case could not continue to constitute a valid basis for refusing the arms licence, particularly when the acquittal had occurred before the appellate authority affirmed the rejection.

The State defended the rejection by relying upon Section 14(1)(b)(ii) of the Arms Act, contending that public peace and public safety were relevant considerations for determining whether an arms licence should be granted.

The Patna High Court allowed the writ petition.

The Court held that possession of a firearm in India is not a fundamental right, but is regulated as a statutory privilege under the Arms Act, 1959.

However, the statutory discretion vested in licensing authorities must be exercised on the basis of relevant material and legally permissible considerations.

The Court held that the mere registration or pendency of a routine FIR cannot ordinarily constitute sufficient ground for outright rejection of an arms licence application.

There must be relevant material demonstrating misuse of arms, violence or a direct threat to public peace or public safety before such considerations can justify refusal.

The Court observed that administrative discretion under the Arms Act cannot be exercised on the basis of generalized assumptions or mere apprehension unsupported by relevant material.

The Court attached significance to the fact that the petitioner had already been acquitted of the criminal case on 23 February 2024.

The acquittal had occurred before the Divisional Commissioner passed the order affirming the District Magistrate's rejection.

Consequently, continued reliance upon the pendency of that criminal case as the principal basis for refusing the licence was found to be unsustainable.

The Court also emphasized the importance of properly considering the police verification report and threat assessment.

The District Magistrate and Divisional Commissioner were therefore found to have proceeded on an insufficient basis while rejecting the petitioner's application.

The High Court quashed both the District Magistrate's order and the Divisional Commissioner's order.

Instead of directing automatic grant of the arms licence, the Court directed the District Magistrate, Patna to reconsider the application afresh.

The reconsideration was directed to take place after obtaining a fresh police report.

The authorities were also directed to consider the petitioner's status as a builder and businessman, along with his stated requirement for self-protection arising from the nature of his work.

The application was directed to be decided within three months.

The central principle of the judgment is that statutory discretion under the Arms Act cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on the basis of mere assumptions.

The Court first clarified the legal status of an arms licence by observing that possession of a firearm is not a fundamental right in India.

Because firearm possession is regulated by statute, an applicant must satisfy the statutory requirements before a licence can be granted.

However, the fact that the right is statutory does not mean that the licensing authority possesses an unrestricted or arbitrary discretion.

Section 14(1)(b)(ii) permits refusal where necessary for maintaining public peace or public safety, but the authority must have a rational and relevant basis for reaching such a conclusion.

The Court therefore rejected the approach of treating the mere existence of an FIR as automatically demonstrating that an applicant poses a danger to public safety.

Registration of an FIR is only an allegation and does not by itself establish guilt or misuse of a firearm.

In the present case, the importance of the criminal case was further diminished because the petitioner had already been acquitted before the appellate authority affirmed the rejection.

The Divisional Commissioner was therefore required to consider the changed factual position instead of mechanically relying upon the earlier pendency of the case.

The judgment emphasizes the importance of considering current and relevant circumstances when exercising administrative or statutory discretion.

The Court also highlighted the significance of police verification.

Where the police authorities conduct verification and make a recommendation, the licensing authority must meaningfully consider that material rather than disregarding it through generalized assumptions.

The Court's approach also recognizes that a person's occupation and circumstances may be relevant to an application for an arms licence, particularly where the applicant claims a genuine need for protection.

However, the Court did not treat the petitioner's occupation as automatically creating an entitlement to an arms licence.

Instead, it directed the authority to reconsider the application after obtaining a fresh police report and examining all relevant circumstances in accordance with law.

This distinction is important: the High Court corrected the decision-making process but did not substitute its own decision for that of the competent licensing authority.

The judgment reinforces the principle that licensing discretion must be based on relevant and objective material.

A pending or registered criminal case cannot automatically be treated as conclusive proof that an applicant is unfit to possess a firearm.

Authorities must examine whether there is an actual connection between the applicant and public safety concerns.

An acquittal occurring before the final administrative decision is a relevant circumstance that cannot be ignored.

Police verification and threat assessments must be properly considered rather than accepted or rejected through generalized assumptions.

The decision also demonstrates that judicial review may intervene where an administrative authority relies upon an irrelevant, outdated or insufficient basis for exercising statutory discretion.

At the same time, the judgment preserves the statutory regulatory framework governing firearms and does not create an automatic right to obtain an arms licence.