Sachindra Kumar Pandey v. Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Others, 2026
Bank Employee’s Termination Quashed as Unconstitutional
Judgement Details
Court
High Court of Allahabad
Date of Decision
3 September 2026
Judges
Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Indrajeet Shukla
Citation
Acts / Provisions
Facts of the Case
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Sachindra Kumar Pandey was appointed as a Clerk in Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank on 4 June 1981 and joined service on 22 July 1981.
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He was initially placed on one-year probation. His probation was subsequently extended by six months under Regulation 8(2).
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The maximum extended probationary period expired on 19 January 1983, but no formal order confirming or discharging him was passed at that stage.
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On 11 March 1983, the Bank terminated his services under Regulation 10, paying one month's salary in lieu of notice.
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Pandey challenged the termination through several rounds of litigation. His civil suit was initially decreed in his favour in 1985, but the decree was subsequently reversed.
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In 2000, the High Court held that the Civil Court could not examine the validity of the statutory Regulations and permitted him to pursue an appropriate remedy under Article 226 or the Industrial Disputes Act.
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His writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge on 19 May 2004.
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He thereafter pursued the Special Appeal, which remained pending for many years.
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Meanwhile, Regulation 10(2) had already been declared unconstitutional by the Allahabad High Court in Rudra Kumar Pal v. Chairman, Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, following the Supreme Court's ruling in M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank.
Issues
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Whether Sachindra Kumar Pandey had continued merely as a probationer or had acquired deemed confirmation after the maximum permissible probation period expired?
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Whether Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980 was constitutionally valid?
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Whether the earlier declaration that Regulation 10(2) was unconstitutional operated retrospectively so as to invalidate a termination order made in 1983?
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Whether the termination order dated 11 March 1983 could survive when it was founded upon a Regulation subsequently declared unconstitutional?
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What relief should be granted after more than four decades, particularly regarding back wages and post-retiral benefits?
Judgement
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The Allahabad High Court allowed the Special Appeal and set aside the Single Judge's judgment dated 19 May 2004.
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The Court held that Pandey had effectively acquired deemed confirmation after the maximum permissible probation period expired. The Court relied significantly upon the Supreme Court's decision in M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, where a substantially similar service regulation had been held invalid.
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The Court further held that Regulation 10(2) had already been declared unconstitutional by the Allahabad High Court in Rudra Kumar Pal. Since it was a post-Constitution regulation violating fundamental rights, its declaration of invalidity operated retrospectively.
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Therefore, the termination order dated 11 March 1983, which was based upon that Regulation, could not legally survive.
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Because Pandey had already crossed the age of superannuation, reinstatement was no longer practical. The Court therefore directed payment of 50% back wages from the date of termination until the date of superannuation, together with applicable post-retiral benefits. The Court also awarded ₹10,000 as costs.
Held
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Regulation 10(2)(a) was unconstitutional and could not sustain the termination.
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The appellant had become deemed confirmed after expiry of the maximum permissible probation period.
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An unconstitutional post-Constitution regulation is void ab initio and cannot validate an action taken under it even before the date on which the Court formally declared it unconstitutional.
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The termination dated 11 March 1983 was quashed.
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The appellant was entitled to 50% back wages from termination until superannuation.
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He was also entitled to applicable post-retiral benefits.
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The Special Appeal was allowed with costs of ₹10,000.
Analysis
- The Court examined the probation provisions carefully. Since the maximum permissible period had expired and the employee had neither been confirmed nor discharged during that period, the Court found support for the conclusion that he had acquired deemed confirmation. The Court distinguished authorities where the applicable service rules expressly excluded deemed confirmation.
- The impugned Regulation gave the Bank a broad power to terminate employment by notice or payment in lieu of notice. The constitutional problem was the absence of adequate safeguards against arbitrary and unguided termination. The principle from M.K. Agarwal was particularly important because the Supreme Court had invalidated a substantially similar provision as contrary to Article 14.
- One of the most important aspects of the judgment is its treatment of post-Constitution laws declared unconstitutional. The Court held that such a provision is void ab initio, stillborn and non est. Therefore, a later judicial declaration does not make the provision valid for the period before the declaration.
- The Court distinguished the position concerning pre-Constitution laws. The doctrine of eclipse can permit certain pre-Constitution laws to remain dormant when inconsistent with fundamental rights and potentially revive in appropriate circumstances. The Court held that this principle does not save a post-Constitution provision that has been declared unconstitutional.
- The judgment reinforces the principle that even statutory/public-sector employers cannot exercise employment powers in an arbitrary manner. Service regulations must conform to constitutional guarantees, particularly Article 14.
- The Court did not mechanically grant full back wages. Considering that Pandey had worked for only a relatively short period before termination and the extraordinary passage of time, the Court considered 50% back wages together with post-retiral benefits to be an appropriate and equitable remedy.
- The case demonstrates that a declaration of unconstitutionality can have consequences for past administrative actions founded upon the invalid provision. It also illustrates the importance of constitutional judicial review in protecting employees against arbitrary exercise of statutory powers.