S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People's Education Trust (R) & Ors. Etc, 2026

The appellants instituted proceedings under Section 92 CPC against the People's Education Trust along with an application seeking leave to institute the suit.

While the application seeking leave was pending, the Civil Court passed an order under Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC, constituting an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the day-to-day affairs of the Trust.

The Karnataka High Court set aside the Civil Court's order, holding that a proceeding under Section 92 CPC remains stillborn in the absence of leave and that no interlocutory or supplemental order could be passed before such leave was granted.

The appellants challenged the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court considered the conflicting views of different High Courts on whether a Civil Court can exercise protective or preservatory jurisdiction while an application for leave under Section 92 CPC is pending.

The appellants argued that provisions relating to receivership, supplemental proceedings and inherent powers permitted the Civil Court to protect the trust property even before leave was granted.

The respondents contended that the grant of leave under Section 92 is a mandatory pre-condition for institution of the suit, and therefore no interlocutory jurisdiction can arise before leave is granted.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, thereby affirming the Karnataka High Court's decision.

The Court held that grant of leave under Section 92 CPC is a mandatory pre-condition for institution of a suit concerning a public charitable or religious trust.

Until such leave is granted, there is no pending suit or lis before the Civil Court in which interlocutory or supplemental powers can be exercised.

Consequently, a Civil Court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while an application seeking leave under Section 92 remains pending.

The Court held that Section 94 and Order XL Rule 1 CPC cannot be invoked before the underlying suit itself comes into existence.

The Court further held that Section 151 CPC cannot be used to circumvent the special statutory safeguards contained in Section 92 CPC.

Appointment of a receiver in respect of a public trust was held to be more than a merely preservatory measure because it can displace the existing management of the trust.

However, the Court clarified that in compelling and genuinely urgent circumstances, the Court may dispense with notice before granting leave, provided reasons for doing so are recorded in writing.

The judgment establishes a clear distinction between the leave stage and the suit stage under Section 92 CPC.

Section 92 operates as a statutory gateway: until the Court grants leave, the representative suit does not mature into a legally instituted suit.

The decision prevents parties from obtaining indirectly, through interim applications, relief that could substantially affect the management or property of a public trust before crossing the statutory threshold of leave.

The Court treated Section 92 as a special provision designed to balance two competing objectives: protecting public charitable or religious trusts from vexatious litigation while providing a mechanism to address genuine mismanagement.

The Court rejected the argument that registration of the leave application as a separate petition makes it a substantive proceeding capable of supporting interlocutory relief. The leave inquiry was characterized as a threshold proceeding.

The Court also clarified the limits of supplemental proceedings. Such proceedings necessarily presuppose an underlying valid proceeding; they cannot be used to create jurisdiction where the statutory pre-condition for institution of the suit has not yet been satisfied.

The ruling is significant concerning receivership. Even though appointment of a receiver may ordinarily be described as protective, its practical effect on the management of a public trust can be intrusive and therefore cannot be ordered before leave is granted.

The judgment also reinforces the principle that inherent powers cannot be exercised in conflict with an express statutory scheme.

At the same time, the Court preserved a mechanism for genuinely urgent cases by permitting ex parte consideration of the leave application, thereby avoiding a situation where the statutory requirement of prior leave itself becomes an obstacle to immediate protection in exceptional circumstances.