Ram Autar Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. & Another, 2026

The petitioner had retired in 1999 from the post of Station Officer.

Before his retirement, he claimed that he had been denied promotion while his juniors were promoted.

He submitted a representation challenging the denial of promotion.

The representation was rejected.

The petitioner approached the High Court and obtained a direction requiring the Director General of Police (DGP) to reconsider his promotion claim.

The DGP rejected the claim by an order dated 6 April 2010.

The DGP relied upon adverse remarks in the petitioner's confidential reports and an earlier censure while rejecting his claim for promotion.

The petitioner challenged the decision before the appropriate Tribunal.

The Tribunal dismissed his claim on 30 November 2012.

The Tribunal noted that the Presenting Officer was present but had not advanced arguments on behalf of the department.

The Tribunal nevertheless found that the DGP had passed a reasoned and speaking order.

The petitioner subsequently filed a review application before the Tribunal.

In the review application, he specifically contended that several adverse entries relied upon against him had never been communicated to him.

The Tribunal dismissed the review on 10 June 2013, observing that there was insufficient evidence establishing that the adverse entries had not been communicated.

The petitioner then approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

His writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution on 16 February 2015.

A restoration application was subsequently filed but was dismissed for want of prosecution by a coordinate Bench on 11 December 2025.

The petitioner thereafter sought recall/restoration of the order dismissing his restoration application.

The petitioner appeared in person before the High Court.

The Court noted that he was more than 85 years old and had travelled from Parasoeli Odamapur in Etawah district to attend the hearings.

The Court considered his conduct in pursuing the litigation as demonstrating diligence rather than abandonment.

The Court also examined the department's failure to produce important records concerning the petitioner's promotion assessment.

The DGP's order stated that the petitioner had been considered for promotion through an interview involving his service record, departmental rules and police procedures.

However, the State failed to produce the marksheet or tabulation showing how the petitioner and successful candidates had been assessed.

The Court also noted that the State failed to establish that the adverse entries relied upon by the DGP had actually been communicated to the petitioner.

The Court consequently found that the petitioner had been treated unfairly.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the restoration applications.

The Court restored the petitioner's writ petition to its original file and number.

The Court held that an employee cannot ordinarily be required to prove the negative proposition that an adverse entry was never communicated to him.

The Court held that where the employee specifically denies communication, it is for the department to demonstrate that communication was actually made.

The Tribunal therefore erred in placing the burden on the petitioner to prove non-communication.

The Court distinguished a restoration application from a writ petition under Article 226.

It observed that while Article 226 does not prescribe a fixed limitation period for filing a writ petition, delay may affect the exercise of the High Court's discretionary jurisdiction.

A restoration application, however, is governed by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned where sufficient cause is established.

The Court considered the petitioner's age, personal appearance and continued efforts to prosecute the proceedings.

These circumstances demonstrated diligence in pursuing the litigation.

The Court also found that the State had failed to produce the records showing how the petitioner had actually been assessed for promotion.

The DGP's assertion that the petitioner had been considered for promotion was therefore unsupported by the relevant assessment record.

The Court found that the reliance on unproven adverse entries, combined with the absence of assessment records, resulted in unfair treatment of the petitioner.

The Court therefore quashed the Tribunal's judgment.

It issued a mandamus directing the respondents to promote the petitioner to the post of Inspector of Civil Police with effect from 16 March 1980.

The Court directed that the petitioner's promotional salary and benefits be calculated from 16 March 1980 until his retirement.

Corresponding retiral benefits were also directed to be recalculated and granted.

Burden of proving communication: The central principle is that proving a positive fact—such as sending and communicating an adverse entry—is fundamentally different from requiring an employee to prove a negative fact that communication never occurred.

Natural justice: Communication of an adverse entry gives an employee an opportunity to know the criticism, submit a representation and seek its correction. Using an uncommunicated adverse entry against an employee can therefore undermine procedural fairness.

Service-record transparency: The judgment emphasises that adverse entries cannot simply remain buried in confidential records and later be used as decisive grounds for denying promotion without establishing that the employee was informed.

Departmental responsibility: When the department relies upon a particular adverse entry, it should be capable of producing the relevant official record showing that the entry was properly communicated.

Evidence cannot be demanded impossibly: The Court's reasoning recognises the practical difficulty of proving that something never happened. An employee ordinarily cannot produce documentary evidence proving the complete absence of communication.

Promotion assessment must be supported by records: The DGP's order stated that the petitioner had been considered through an interview, but the State could not produce the relevant marksheet or assessment tabulation. This weakened the claim that a genuine and transparent promotion assessment had taken place.

Restoration versus writ petition: The Court made an important procedural distinction. A writ petition under Article 226 does not operate under an ordinary prescribed limitation period in the same manner as a statutory appeal, whereas a restoration application is considered under the framework of Section 5 of the Limitation Act when condonation of delay is sought.

Sufficient cause: The petitioner's advanced age, personal appearance and repeated efforts to pursue the proceedings were relevant circumstances demonstrating that the litigation had not been abandoned deliberately.

Application of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag: The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's liberal approach to condonation of delay, particularly the principle that procedural delay should not automatically defeat a genuine claim where sufficient cause is established.

Unfair administrative action: The combination of unproven adverse entries and missing promotion-assessment records led the Court to conclude that the petitioner had been treated unfairly.

Retrospective promotional relief: The Court granted promotion with effect from 16 March 1980, along with consequential salary and retiral benefits, thereby attempting to place the petitioner in the position he would have occupied had the unlawful denial of promotion not occurred.

Broader significance: The judgment reinforces the principle that public authorities must maintain proper records, follow fair procedures and substantiate adverse service-related decisions when those decisions affect an employee's promotion and career progression.