Rakesh v. State of U.P. and Others, 2026

etitioner, Rakesh, challenged the legality of his arrest in a criminal case registered under Sections 87, 127(4), 64(1) and 143(2) of the BNS.

The petitioner alleged that he was arrested on 20 April 2025.

According to the petitioner, he was never informed of the grounds of his arrest, either orally or in writing.

The State relied upon the arrest memo and General Diary entry to contend that the constitutional requirement had been complied with.

The High Court examined the arrest memo and found that the column relating to the grounds of arrest merely contained standard printed reasons, including the need for investigation, prevention of evidence tampering, prevention of further offences and securing the accused's presence before the Court.

The Court held that these statements constituted reasons for arrest, rather than the specific grounds of arrest based upon the factual circumstances of the case.

The General Diary entry also did not disclose the factual grounds on which the petitioner had been arrested.

Instead, it merely recorded the penal provisions invoked and stated that the Supreme Court's guidelines had been complied with.

The High Court therefore found that there was no contemporaneous disclosure of the specific factual grounds of arrest.

The Court observed that the distinction between “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest” had already been explained by the Supreme Court.

Because the petitioner was not informed of the actual grounds of arrest, he was disabled from effectively exercising his constitutional right under Article 22(1).

The Court also examined the role of the Remand Magistrate who had authorised judicial custody.

The Magistrate had used a printed proforma while authorising remand without independently verifying whether the constitutional requirement concerning communication of grounds of arrest had been satisfied.

The High Court described this as a “classical” case where a remand order became illegal because of failure to ensure compliance with Article 22(1).

The Court noted that the Supreme Court's later direction in Mihir Rajesh Shah requiring grounds of arrest to be furnished at the time of arrest or at least two hours before production before the Magistrate was prospective and therefore did not apply to this arrest.

However, the Court held that even under the law applicable at the time of the petitioner's arrest, the petitioner ought to have been informed of the grounds of arrest either at the time of arrest or within a reasonable period thereafter.

The Court found that this requirement had admittedly not been fulfilled.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition.

The Court held that the petitioner had not been informed of the actual grounds of his arrest as required by Article 22(1).

The Court found that the arrest memo merely contained general reasons for arrest and did not disclose the factual grounds of arrest.

The General Diary entry also failed to provide the petitioner with the specific factual basis of his arrest.

The Court emphasized that reasons for arrest and grounds of arrest are legally distinct concepts.

The Court held that merely reproducing standard statutory or procedural reasons does not satisfy the constitutional requirement where the actual factual grounds are not communicated.

The Court observed that because the petitioner did not know the precise grounds on which he had been arrested, he was deprived of the meaningful exercise of his right under Article 22(1).

The Court also criticised the Remand Magistrate for mechanically authorising judicial custody through a printed proforma.

The Magistrate was required to ascertain whether the constitutional requirement concerning communication of the grounds of arrest had been complied with before authorising remand.

The Court therefore held the remand order to be illegal.

The Court quashed the remand order.

The petitioner was directed to be released upon furnishing bonds under Section 91 BNSS.

The Court further directed the Sessions Judge, Sambhal, to ensure that Magistrates under his administrative control do not mechanically authorise police or judicial remand through printed proformas.

Magistrates were directed to first ascertain whether the constitutional requirement concerning communication of the grounds of arrest had been satisfied.

Article 22(1) as a substantive safeguard: The judgment reinforces that the right to know the grounds of arrest is not a mere procedural formality. It is a constitutional safeguard protecting an individual's personal liberty.

Reasons versus grounds: The most important distinction in the judgment is between “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest.” General statements such as the need for investigation or prevention of evidence tampering do not necessarily tell an accused why, on the specific facts of the case, he has been arrested.

Specific factual disclosure: The police must communicate the factual basis underlying the arrest sufficiently for the arrested person to understand the case against him at the arrest stage.

Arrest memo cannot be mechanical: The Court rejected the use of standard printed clauses as a substitute for actual communication of grounds. A formal document does not automatically establish constitutional compliance.

General Diary entry insufficient: Recording the sections of law invoked and stating that guidelines were followed cannot replace disclosure of the factual grounds of arrest.

Meaningful exercise of constitutional rights: The Court linked communication of grounds with the accused's ability to exercise constitutional and legal remedies. If the accused does not know why he has been arrested, the right under Article 22(1) becomes substantially impaired.

Judicial responsibility at remand stage: The judgment places an important responsibility on Magistrates. The Magistrate is not merely required to mechanically sign a remand order. The constitutional requirements governing detention must first be verified.

Printed proforma criticism: The Court's criticism of the Remand Magistrate demonstrates that judicial scrutiny at the remand stage is an important safeguard against unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.

Effect of illegal arrest: The Court made an important observation that where the arrest itself violates the constitutional safeguard, restoration of liberty cannot be denied merely because the underlying criminal allegation is serious.

Prospective operation of later directions: The Court carefully distinguished the later direction in Mihir Rajesh Shah from the law applicable to the petitioner's arrest. Even though that particular timing requirement was prospective, the underlying constitutional duty to communicate grounds already existed.

Police training and fundamental rights: The Court strongly criticised what it viewed as a traditional police attitude toward fundamental rights. It emphasized that law-enforcement training must adequately address constitutional protections and judicial decisions concerning personal liberty.

Judicial oversight of police power: The judgment underscores the constitutional role of courts in ensuring that police powers of arrest do not become detached from fundamental rights.

Impact on remand proceedings: Magistrates must independently verify constitutional compliance before authorising custody. This places a practical check on automatic or routine remand orders.

Overall significance: The judgment reinforces a simple but important constitutional principle: an arrest cannot be treated as lawful merely because the police have recorded general reasons for making it; the arrested person must be informed of the actual grounds, and the Magistrate must verify compliance before authorising custody.