Mukesh Jain v. State of Karnataka, 2026

The proceedings arose from a cybercrime investigation involving an alleged fraud of approximately ₹4.83 crore.

The complainant, Rajath Jain, was allegedly involved in stock-market trading.

According to the complaint, Rajath Jain came across a Telegram group called “Unlisted Shares”.

The group was allegedly operated by Akashdeep Singh and his associates.

It was alleged that members of the group induced the complainant to invest money in unlisted shares by promising substantial returns.

The complainant was allegedly asked to pay approximately ₹4.5 crore for 3,000 shares.

Acting on the representations made through the group, the complainant allegedly transferred approximately ₹4.83 crore to various bank accounts provided through the Telegram group.

The Telegram group was subsequently deleted.

A complaint was registered on 8 July 2025.

The case involved allegations under Sections 319(2) and 318(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act.

In his statement, the complainant named several persons, including the present petitioner, Mukesh Jain.

It was alleged that, on the advice of Akash Deep Singh, certain amounts had also been transferred to an account connected with the petitioner.

During the investigation, a search warrant was issued.

The petitioner's residence and other premises were searched by the investigating agency.

During the searches, the police seized several articles, including cash, gold ornaments, silver articles, cheque books, gold photo frames and mobile phones.

The petitioner sought interim custody/disposal of the seized articles by filing an application under Sections 497 and 503 BNSS.

The property had been searched and seized on 25 August 2025.

The seizure report was submitted before the concerned Court on 26 August 2025.

The petitioner filed his application seeking disposal/interim custody of the seized property on 3 September 2025.

Under Section 497(2) BNSS, the statement of the property ought to have been prepared within 14 days from its production before the Court.

According to the High Court's calculation, the statement ought to have been prepared by approximately 9 September 2025.

Under Section 497(5) BNSS, the concerned Court was thereafter required to pass an appropriate order within 30 days after preparation of the statement and completion of the prescribed photographic or videographic procedure.

The High Court therefore calculated that the requisite order ought to have been passed by approximately 9 October 2025.

Despite this statutory timeline, when the writ petition was filed on 16 February 2026, the petitioner's application had still not been disposed of.

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking a direction to the XLVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, to dispose of his application.

The State opposed the petition and argued that the High Court should not put pressure on the Magistrate because consideration of the application required hearing the parties and disposal in accordance with law.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition filed by Mukesh Jain.

The Court examined the statutory scheme under Section 497 BNSS concerning seized property.

The Court observed that Section 497(1) BNSS expands the scope of the corresponding power under Section 451 CrPC.

Under Section 451 CrPC, the provision primarily concerned property produced before a criminal court during the pendency of an inquiry or trial.

Section 497(1) BNSS, however, enables the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders concerning property even during the investigation stage.

The Court specifically examined Sections 497(2) to 497(5) BNSS, which introduce prescribed timelines concerning the handling and disposal of seized property.

The Court held that Section 497(2) requires the concerned Court or Magistrate to prepare a statement describing the property within 14 days from the date of its production.

The Court further noted that Section 497(3) contemplates the prescribed photography or videography of the property.

Section 497(5) then requires the Court or Magistrate to pass an appropriate order concerning disposal, destruction, confiscation or delivery of the property within 30 days after the statement is prepared and the required photographic or videographic process is completed.

Reading Sections 497(2) and 497(5) together, the Court held that the concerned Court or Magistrate is required to pass the requisite order within 45 days from the date of seizure, in the circumstances contemplated by the provision.

The Court applied this statutory timeline to the facts of the petitioner's case.

The property was seized on 25 August 2025 and the seizure report was produced before the concerned Court on 26 August 2025.

The petitioner submitted his application for interim custody/disposal on 3 September 2025.

The Court observed that the statement ought to have been prepared within the prescribed 14-day period.

The Court calculated that the concerned Magistrate ought to have prepared the statement by approximately 9 September 2025.

The requisite order concerning the property ought thereafter to have been passed within the subsequent 30-day period, approximately by 9 October 2025.

However, when the petitioner approached the High Court on 16 February 2026, the application remained pending.

The Court held that the delay was contrary to the statutory mandate.

The Court observed that the concerned Court had effectively “rendered the mandate of the statute nugatory” by failing to comply with the prescribed timeline.

The Court relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Kanak Cattle Feeds Private Limited v. State of U.P. and the Madras High Court in R. Saiju v. The Superintendent of Police, Theni.

Those decisions reinforced the principle that courts dealing with applications concerning seized property must adhere to the statutory framework.

The Court also relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat.

The Supreme Court had emphasised that seized articles should not unnecessarily remain in police custody for prolonged periods and should ordinarily be dealt with expeditiously in accordance with law.

The Karnataka High Court therefore directed the XLVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, to dispose of the petitioner's pending application.

The Magistrate was directed to dispose of the application within one week from receipt of a copy of the High Court's order.

The judgment is significant because it gives practical effect to the time-bound mechanism introduced by Section 497 BNSS for seized property.

The Court's interpretation treats the timelines in Sections 497(2) and 497(5) as a statutory mandate rather than merely an administrative guideline.

The decision recognises that prolonged retention of seized property can cause serious prejudice to property owners, particularly where the property consists of cash, jewellery, electronic devices, documents or other valuable articles.

The Court's calculation of the 14-day and 30-day periods creates a clear framework for determining when judicial action is expected.

The combined operation of Sections 497(2) and 497(5) was interpreted as requiring the concerned Court to act within an overall period of 45 days from seizure, subject to the statutory sequence contemplated by the provisions.

The judgment highlights an important difference between Section 451 CrPC and Section 497 BNSS.

Section 497(1) BNSS expands the statutory power by enabling the Court or Magistrate to deal with property even during the investigation stage, whereas Section 451 CrPC operated in the context of an inquiry or trial.

The introduction of specific timelines under the BNSS represents a move towards preventing seized property from remaining indefinitely in police or judicial custody.

The Court's approach is consistent with the broader judicial principle that seized property should not be unnecessarily retained when its continued physical custody is not required for the purposes of investigation or trial.

The reliance on Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat reinforces the principle that valuable property should be dealt with expeditiously rather than being allowed to deteriorate or remain unnecessarily in police custody.

The Court's reasoning also recognises that modern criminal investigations can involve substantial quantities of cash, jewellery and electronic devices, making timely judicial supervision particularly important.

The judgment does not mean that every application for interim custody must automatically be allowed.

Rather, the Court requires the competent Magistrate to consider and decide the application within the statutory framework.

The prosecution and investigating agency continue to have the opportunity to oppose release or disposal where the property is required for investigation, evidence, confiscation or another lawful purpose.

The State's argument that the Magistrate needed time to hear the parties was not accepted as justification for ignoring the statutory timeline.

The requirement to provide parties with an opportunity of hearing does not, by itself, permit the Court to disregard a statutory deadline.

The expression that the statutory mandate had been rendered “nugatory” demonstrates the Court's concern that legislative timelines cannot be defeated through administrative or judicial inaction.

The judgment strengthens the principle of judicial accountability in the handling of seized property.

It also provides a useful remedy for property owners whose applications remain pending for an unreasonable period despite the existence of a specific statutory timeline.

The decision may have wider procedural significance because Section 497 BNSS is part of the new criminal procedural framework that replaced the corresponding provisions of the CrPC.

The judgment therefore helps clarify how courts should operationalise the new BNSS regime concerning custody and disposal of seized property.

The Court's direction requiring disposal within one week demonstrates that once a statutory violation has been established, the High Court may issue a specific supervisory direction to ensure that the pending application is decided promptly.

The judgment balances the interests of the investigation with the rights of property holders by requiring timely judicial determination, rather than automatic release of seized property.

The decision is particularly relevant to cases involving cybercrime and financial fraud, where investigations frequently result in seizure or freezing of substantial assets and valuable articles.

Overall, the judgment establishes that statutory timelines under Section 497 BNSS must be treated seriously and that courts cannot allow applications concerning seized property to remain pending indefinitely.