Maqbool Buhroo and Others v. Ahad Buhroo and Others, 2026

During the pendency of the appeal, Respondent No. 7 died.

No formal application was filed by the respondents' counsel informing the Court about the death of the respondent.

In one earlier application, the word “dead” was merely written against the respondent's name in a very small font.

The date, month, and year of death were not disclosed.

Subsequently, surviving respondents sought dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it had abated because the appellants failed to substitute the legal representatives within the prescribed limitation period.

The appellants filed applications seeking:

• Condonation of delay,

• Setting aside of abatement, and

• Substitution of legal representatives.

The appellants contended that they became aware of the respondent's death only when an application seeking dismissal of the appeal as abated was filed.

They argued that the respondents' counsel had failed to discharge the statutory duty under Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC.

The respondents opposed the plea, contending that the parties belonged to the same village and therefore the appellants were aware of the death.

The High Court examined whether the respondents had properly complied with Rule 10-A CPC and whether sufficient cause existed for condoning the delay.

The High Court held that Rule 10-A CPC casts a statutory duty upon counsel to formally inform the Court about the death of the party represented by him.

The Court observed that counsel is generally the best person to know about the death of his client and must communicate the same to the Court.

The Bench found that merely writing the word “dead” in a very small font against the respondent's name did not amount to compliance with Rule 10-A.

It noted that the word was deliberately written in a manner that could easily escape attention.

The Court emphasized that the date, month, and year of death were not disclosed.

The Bench observed that such conduct appeared intended to keep the appellants unaware until the limitation period expired.

The Court rejected the argument that residents of the same village must necessarily be aware of the legal consequences arising from the death of a party.

It held that ordinary litigants cannot be expected to understand the technical legal consequences relating to abatement and substitution.

The Court reiterated that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal interpretation.

It emphasized that courts ordinarily prefer adjudication on merits rather than termination of proceedings on technical grounds.

Consequently, the Court condoned the delay and set aside the abatement.

The judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC and clarifies the obligations of advocates toward the Court and opposing parties.

The Court recognized that procedural fairness requires timely disclosure of a party's death so that the opposite side can take necessary legal steps.

By rejecting technical compliance through a cryptic notation, the Court emphasized substance over form.

The ruling protects litigants from being deprived of substantive rights due to procedural manoeuvres or lack of transparency.

The judgment promotes ethical litigation conduct and discourages strategic silence regarding material facts.

The Court's liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” advances the objective of substantial justice.

The decision reflects the judicial preference for resolving disputes on merits rather than dismissing cases on technical procedural defaults.

The ruling is significant because it clarifies that awareness of a person's death does not automatically translate into awareness of the legal requirement to substitute legal representatives.

The judgment strengthens access to justice by preventing abatement from becoming a tool for defeating legitimate claims through procedural technicalities.