Manan Chugh v. State of Haryana and another, 2026

The petitioner-complainant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, whereby regular bail had been granted to respondent No. 2.

The criminal case arose from an FIR registered under Sections 318(4), 3(5) and 316(2) of the BNS.

According to the complainant, respondent No. 2, along with her father and other co-accused, was involved in operating a travel-related business.

The complainant alleged that he had paid approximately ₹8,90,000 for travel arrangements.

According to the allegations, as the date of travel approached, the complainant discovered that the air tickets and hotel reservations provided to him were allegedly forged, cancelled or otherwise invalid.

The complainant was consequently required to make alternative travel arrangements at substantially higher expense.

The petitioner alleged that the transaction was not merely a contractual dispute but formed part of a deliberate scheme involving cheating and forgery from the very beginning.

The petitioner contended that the trial court had failed to properly appreciate the investigative material available against respondent No. 2.

The petitioner also relied upon alleged multiple similar FIRs and other material concerning respondent No. 2.

It was further alleged that respondent No. 2 posed a flight risk, particularly because she had previously been intercepted at the IGI Airport while allegedly attempting to travel to Dubai.

The petitioner also raised concerns regarding alleged foreign connections and the possibility of the accused evading the process of law or influencing witnesses.

The State supported the petitioner's case and referred to the alleged pattern of similar offences attributed to respondent No. 2.

On the other hand, counsel for respondent No. 2 argued that the petition was effectively an attempt to obtain a review of the bail order passed by the Sessions Court.

It was argued that there had been no supervening circumstance after the grant of bail, such as misuse of bail, interference with witnesses, tampering with evidence or violation of bail conditions.

The respondent therefore contended that the petition did not satisfy the legal requirements for cancellation or setting aside of an already granted bail order.

The High Court consequently examined the distinction between cancellation of bail and setting aside of a bail order.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the petition seeking to set aside the regular bail granted to respondent No. 2.

The Court held that there is a conceptual distinction between cancellation of bail and setting aside of a bail order.

The Court explained that a plea for cancellation of bail ordinarily concerns supervening circumstances or misconduct occurring after bail has been granted.

Such circumstances may include misuse of the concession of bail, attempts to tamper with evidence, influencing witnesses, evading the process of law or violating conditions imposed by the court.

In contrast, a plea seeking setting aside of the bail order itself requires examination of whether the original order was unjustified, illegal, perverse or based upon irrelevant considerations.

The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Dinesh Madan v. State of Haryana, decided on 17 May 2024, for the distinction between the two remedies.

The High Court found that the present petition was, in substance, a challenge to the original bail order, rather than a case based upon subsequent misconduct by the accused.

The Court examined whether the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge was perverse, illegal or based on wholly irrelevant considerations.

The Court found that the trial court had passed a well-reasoned and speaking order.

The trial court had primarily considered that the question of culpability would ultimately have to be established through evidence.

The Court also took into account the progress of the trial and the fact that the challan had already been presented.

The High Court found that the petitioner had not produced material showing that respondent No. 2 had, after obtaining bail, attempted to influence witnesses, tamper with evidence or violate any condition imposed upon her.

The Court held that the apprehensions raised by the petitioner were largely speculative and unsupported by cogent material.

The Court observed that mere dissatisfaction with the reasoning adopted by the court granting bail does not constitute sufficient ground for setting aside the bail order.

Similarly, the seriousness of the alleged offences by itself was not considered sufficient to recall or set aside an otherwise legally sustainable bail order.

The Court noted that the allegations concerning the nature and gravity of the offence, as well as the alleged pattern of similar offences, were matters that were already available when the original bail application was considered.

Such matters could not simply be re-agitated in the absence of a legally sufficient subsequent circumstance or a finding that the original bail order was perverse or illegal.

The Court therefore found no sufficient ground to interfere with the regular bail order.

However, considering the factual circumstances and the concern regarding the accused's possible flight risk, the Court directed respondent No. 2 to surrender her passport within seven days before the concerned trial court.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the question of bail and would not amount to an expression of opinion on the merits of the criminal case.

The central issue in the case was not simply whether the allegations against the accused were serious, but what legal standard applies when an already granted bail order is challenged.

The Court drew a clear distinction between two situations:

• Cancellation of bail based on subsequent conduct or supervening circumstances.

• Setting aside of the original bail order because the order itself was legally defective.

This distinction is important because once a person has been granted bail, the court does not ordinarily reconsider the entire bail question as though the application were being heard for the first time.

For setting aside the original order, the petitioner must demonstrate a fundamental defect in the order itself.

The High Court found that the trial court had considered relevant circumstances and had provided reasons for granting bail.

The trial court's consideration that culpability would ultimately have to be determined through evidence was not considered an irrelevant or impermissible consideration.

The fact that the challan had already been presented and that the trial would require time was also a relevant consideration in determining whether continued custody was justified.

The High Court therefore found no perversity or illegality in the original bail order.