M and Anr. v. A, 2026

The petitioners were the husband and mother-in-law of the respondent.

The petitioners approached the Kerala High Court under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of domestic-violence proceedings pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur.

The petitioners contended that there was an approximately six-year delay in approaching the Magistrate under Section 12 of the PWDV Act.

They argued that the alleged acts of domestic violence were not supported by specific and concrete allegations.

The petitioners further pointed out that the respondent had approached various authorities earlier but had not invoked Section 12 of the PWDV Act before the jurisdictional Magistrate during that period.

They relied upon the timing of the proceedings, including litigation before the Family Court and proceedings connected with a POCSO case, to argue that the domestic-violence proceedings were retaliatory.

The respondent opposed the quashing petition and contended that the PWDV Act does not prescribe a specific limitation period for an application under Section 12.

The respondent also relied on an allegation of domestic violence in May 2025, arguing that the existence of delay could not, by itself, establish that the allegations were false.

The High Court considered the Supreme Court precedent in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, which recognised the availability of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases involving proceedings under Section 12(1) of the PWDV Act.

The Court examined whether the alleged delay, considered along with the surrounding circumstances, was sufficient to justify interference at the quashing stage.

The Court ultimately found that the allegations raised questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence and therefore were not appropriate for determination through a preliminary quashing proceeding.

The Kerala High Court dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case and declined to quash the proceedings pending before the Magistrate.

The Court held that the PWDV Act does not prescribe a specific period of limitation within which an aggrieved person must approach the Magistrate under Section 12.

Consequently, mere delay in approaching the Magistrate cannot, by itself, be treated as a ground for quashing proceedings.

The Court particularly noted that the allegations included an act of domestic violence said to have occurred at a later point of time, making the passage of time an insufficient standalone basis for terminating the proceedings.

The Court clarified that the effect of delay, the reasons for the delay and the circumstances in which the respondent remained silent or approached other authorities may be relevant while appreciating the evidence.

Such matters are primarily for the jurisdictional Magistrate to consider while determining whether the allegations are proved and whether relief under the PWDV Act should be granted.

The Court held that a petitioner's mere assertion that the allegations are false does not ordinarily justify interference under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction.

Where the case involves disputed questions of fact, those factual disputes ordinarily require examination of evidence before the competent Magistrate.

The High Court emphasised that while exercising inherent jurisdiction, it should not conduct a meticulous examination of evidence or a “mini-trial” to determine the truthfulness of allegations.

Since specific allegations constituting acts of domestic violence had been attributed to the petitioners, their ultimate truth or falsity was required to be determined by the jurisdictional Magistrate.

The Court therefore found no sufficient ground to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to terminate the proceedings at the preliminary stage.

The judgment distinguishes between delay as an evidentiary circumstance and delay as an automatic legal bar. The Court rejected the latter approach.

The absence of a prescribed limitation period under Section 12 was central to the Court's reasoning: the statute does not make a delayed application automatically inadmissible.

The Court nevertheless did not hold that delay is irrelevant. Instead, it can affect the weight and credibility of evidence, depending on the explanation and surrounding circumstances.

The reference to later alleged acts of domestic violence is significant because it demonstrates why the entire dispute cannot necessarily be assessed solely by looking at the date of the initial alleged conduct.

The judgment reinforces the limited nature of inherent jurisdiction. Section 528 BNSS can be used to prevent abuse of process, but it is not ordinarily a substitute for a full evidentiary proceeding.

Where the parties present competing factual narratives, determining which version is true generally requires evidence, cross-examination and factual adjudication before the competent court.

The Court's refusal to conduct a mini-trial preserves the distinction between the High Court's quashing jurisdiction and the Magistrate's role as the primary fact-finding court.

The judgment also indicates that prior complaints, other litigation and the timing of proceedings may be relevant, but their significance should ordinarily be assessed in the evidentiary context rather than treated as conclusive proof of mala fides.

The decision therefore places emphasis on preventing premature termination of proceedings where the allegations disclose matters that require factual determination.

At the same time, the judgment does not mean that every delayed domestic-violence proceeding must continue regardless of circumstances; the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction where the established legal grounds for interference are otherwise made out.

The ruling thus reinforces a procedural principle: delay may be relevant to the merits, but it does not automatically extinguish the statutory remedy under Section 12 of the PWDV Act.