K v. I, 2026

The husband instituted matrimonial proceedings seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.

During the pendency of the proceedings, he filed applications seeking permission to produce primary and secondary evidence, including electronic records.

The documents included secretly recorded telephone conversations between the spouses, medical records, proof of payments, air tickets, photographs, travel expenses, and money transfer records.

The trial court rejected the applications, holding that the electronic recordings were unsupported by the mandatory certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

The trial court also observed that there was no clarity regarding the availability of the original device or any effort to obtain the required certificate.

The husband challenged the order before the High Court, contending that the documents should be received in evidence and that their admissibility could be determined during final adjudication.

He further argued that the authenticity of the call recordings had been verified by Truth Labs and that the recordings had been produced before the trial court in a sealed cover.

With respect to the remaining documents, the husband submitted that they had been downloaded from authentic banking and financial websites and that he was prepared to establish their genuineness before the trial court.

The High Court dismissed both civil revision petitions.

The Court held that secretly recording a spouse's telephone conversations without consent constitutes an infringement of the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court ruled that such recordings cannot be admitted in evidence in matrimonial proceedings in the absence of the other spouse's consent.

The Court upheld the trial court's finding that the electronic records did not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Court observed that the husband had failed to establish the availability of the original recording device or compliance with the statutory requirements governing electronic evidence.

The Court further held that the remaining documents had no meaningful nexus with the allegation of cruelty pleaded in the divorce petition.

The Court observed that the documents instead reflected cordial relations and a successful marital life between the parties.

The Court noted that expenditure incurred by a husband during the subsistence of marriage is a normal marital obligation and does not establish cruelty.

Finding no legal infirmity in the trial court's order, the High Court declined to interfere.

The judgment reinforces the constitutional importance of the right to privacy even within the marital relationship.

By treating secret call recordings as inadmissible, the Court emphasized that matrimonial disputes do not justify unauthorized surveillance of a spouse.

The decision underscores that electronic evidence must satisfy both statutory admissibility requirements and constitutional safeguards.

The Court highlighted that relevance is a fundamental requirement for admissibility, and documents unrelated to the pleaded grounds cannot be received merely because they exist in electronic form.

The judgment reflects a balanced approach by protecting privacy while insisting that parties establish cruelty through legally admissible and relevant evidence.

The Court's reasoning places greater emphasis on constitutional rights than on technological means of collecting evidence.

The decision also serves as guidance that production of voluminous documents without proving their relevance does not assist matrimonial litigation.

The ruling contributes to the evolving jurisprudence on privacy, electronic evidence, and family law, although it differs from the Supreme Court's approach in Vibhor Garg v. Neha (2025) regarding the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations.