Dishant Goel v. Union of India & Others, 2026

The petitioner, Dishant Goel, approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus against his preventive detention under the PIT-NDPS Act, 1988.

The impugned detention order was issued under Section 3(1) of the PIT-NDPS Act on the basis of the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction that the petitioner's activities were prejudicial to preventing illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

The detention order was dated 2 May 2025.

The order was subsequently executed on 30 May 2025.

The detention was ultimately confirmed on 14 August 2025, extending the petitioner's detention for a period of one year from the date of detention.

The authorities relied upon several FIRs registered against the petitioner under the NDPS Act.

The cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority included matters in which the petitioner had been granted bail, acquitted or had already undergone the sentence imposed.

The latest FIR relied upon was dated 12 December 2024, concerning an alleged recovery of 4 grams of heroin. The petitioner was granted bail in that case on 27 December 2024.

The preventive detention proposal was forwarded by the sponsoring authority on 8 January 2025.

Despite the proposal having been initiated in January 2025, the detention order was not passed until 2 May 2025.

The detention order was thereafter executed only on 30 May 2025.

The High Court found that the authorities had failed to adequately explain the delay at these stages.

The petitioner also contended that he had not been supplied with a copy of the detention proposal which formed the basis of the preventive detention proceedings.

Although the petitioner was supplied with the grounds of detention and certain relied-upon documents, the actual detention proposal was withheld.

The respondents argued that the detention proposal was merely an internal communication between the sponsoring authority and the Detaining Authority and therefore did not have to be supplied.

The High Court rejected that contention.

The Court found that the detention proposal contained material particulars, allegations, antecedents and recommendations placed before the Detaining Authority and therefore constituted an important part of the material forming the foundation of the detention.

The petitioner further argued that preventive detention had effectively been used to circumvent the ordinary criminal process after he had obtained bail.

The Court examined whether there was any subsequent conduct showing that the petitioner had misused the liberty granted to him.

The Court found no allegation that the petitioner had violated his bail conditions, absconded, threatened witnesses, tampered with evidence or otherwise engaged in subsequent conduct demonstrating an imminent need for preventive detention.

The High Court allowed the habeas corpus petition.

The Court quashed the preventive detention order dated 2 May 2025 issued under Section 3(1) of the PIT-NDPS Act.

The subsequent confirmation order dated 14 August 2025 was also set aside.

The Court held that the unexplained delay between the initiation of the detention proposal, passing of the detention order and its execution had severed the required “live and proximate link” between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity for preventive detention.

The Court emphasised that preventive detention is intended to prevent future prejudicial conduct and is not a form of punishment for past conduct.

If the State genuinely considered the petitioner to pose an imminent threat requiring preventive detention, the authorities were expected to act with urgency.

The Court found that the prolonged administrative inaction was inconsistent with the claimed urgency underlying preventive detention.

The Court separately held that non-supply of the detention proposal violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

The detention proposal was not treated as a mere internal administrative communication because it contained the material that formed the foundation for the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction.

By withholding the proposal, the authorities deprived the petitioner of material necessary to make an effective and meaningful representation against his detention.

The Court held that the constitutional right of representation under Article 22(5) cannot be reduced to a formal or ritualistic exercise.

The Court further found that preventive detention had effectively been used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal process.

The petitioner had already obtained bail in the latest criminal case relied upon by the Detaining Authority.

There was no material showing that he had violated bail conditions, absconded, threatened witnesses, tampered with evidence or otherwise engaged in subsequent conduct demonstrating an immediate need for preventive detention.

The Court therefore found that the authorities had failed to demonstrate why ordinary criminal-law remedies were inadequate.

The Court also criticised the use of exaggerated descriptions such as “organiser” and “kingpin” where the underlying material did not adequately substantiate such characterisation.

The Court concluded that the detention order had acquired a punitive rather than genuinely preventive character.

The petitioner was therefore ordered to be released, if his custody was not required in any other case.

Preventive versus punitive detention: The judgment strongly reinforces the conceptual distinction between the two. Punitive detention follows adjudication for a past offence, whereas preventive detention is justified by the necessity to prevent future prejudicial conduct.

Live and proximate link: The Court treated proximity as fundamental. When authorities wait for months after initiating preventive detention proceedings, they must satisfactorily explain why the alleged threat remained sufficiently immediate to justify detention.

Delay at multiple stages: The Court was concerned not merely with one isolated delay. The proposal was forwarded on 8 January 2025, the detention order was passed on 2 May 2025, and the order was executed on 30 May 2025. The cumulative delay undermined the asserted urgency.

Article 22(5) safeguard: The judgment treats the right to representation as a substantive constitutional guarantee. Supplying some documents while withholding material that formed the foundation of the detention may deprive the detenue of the ability to meaningfully challenge the detention.

Detention proposal: The Court regarded the proposal as materially significant because it contained allegations, antecedents and recommendations placed before the Detaining Authority. Its non-supply therefore had constitutional consequences in the circumstances of the case.

Bail and preventive detention: The Court did not hold that preventive detention is categorically prohibited after bail. Rather, once bail has been granted, the authorities must identify cogent and proximate material, particularly subsequent conduct, demonstrating why the extraordinary preventive mechanism is necessary.

Ordinary criminal law: The Court emphasised that preventive detention cannot ordinarily be used simply because ordinary prosecution is inconvenient or has not produced the desired custodial result.

No allegation of bail misuse: The absence of allegations that the petitioner violated bail conditions, absconded, threatened witnesses or tampered with evidence was significant. There was no demonstrated supervening conduct establishing an immediate need for preventive detention.

Stale criminal cases: The Court considered that several cases relied upon by the authorities had already resulted in bail, acquittal or completion of sentence. Such material could not automatically establish an ongoing and imminent necessity for preventive detention.

“Kingpin” and “organiser” allegations: The Court was critical of the use of strong labels without corresponding factual material. Characterising a person as an organiser or kingpin requires substantive material supporting that conclusion.

Judicial review remains available: Although the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority receives judicial deference, courts can examine whether constitutional safeguards were complied with and whether the statutory conditions for preventive detention were genuinely satisfied.

Liberty as the controlling constitutional concern: Because preventive detention permits deprivation of liberty without a criminal trial, the Court insisted upon strict compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards.