Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026

The appellant-mother and respondent-father were married on 26 September 2011.

Their son, referred to as Master SSB, was born on 29 April 2013, and their daughter, referred to as Ms. DW, was born on 24 January 2019.

The relationship between the parties deteriorated in 2018 when the mother was approximately four months pregnant.

The mother left the matrimonial home and subsequently continued to care for the children, with the son remaining with her from September 2018 and the daughter being born subsequently.

The father instituted guardianship proceedings seeking custody of the children.

The Family Court ultimately declared the father to be the sole custodian of the children, while granting visitation/interim access to the mother.

The Family Court also restrained the mother from taking the children outside the relevant territorial jurisdiction.

The mother subsequently secured employment as a Lecturer at the University of Hull in the United Kingdom and sought permission to relocate the children to the UK.

The Family Court rejected the relocation request, and the Delhi High Court subsequently affirmed the custody arrangement in favour of the father.

The courts below were substantially influenced by the mother's movement between different institutions and locations during the period when she was pursuing employment in India, characterising her lifestyle as unstable or “nomadic.”

During the pendency of the custody dispute, the son began exhibiting aggressive behaviour and was taken to NIMHANS, Bengaluru, for examination and psychiatric assessment.

During that examination, the child made disclosures indicating sexual abuse allegedly committed by his father.

Following the disclosure, a police complaint was lodged and FIR No. 452/2023 was registered against the father under the POCSO Act.

The police subsequently conducted investigation and filed a chargesheet against the father.

The father's challenge to the POCSO FIR remained pending before the Calcutta High Court.

The Supreme Court interacted with the parties and the children during the proceedings. The Court noted that the son expressed a strong reluctance to remain in the father's company and displayed significant fear at the prospect of being placed with him.

The mother challenged the Delhi High Court's custody and relocation decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court was therefore required to consider the children's best interests, the pending POCSO prosecution against the father, the child's disclosure, the mother's proposed relocation to the UK and the impact of the existing custody arrangement on the children's welfare.

The Court also examined observations made by the Delhi High Court casting doubt upon the POCSO allegations and describing them as motivated or a counterblast.

The Supreme Court found such observations premature because the criminal proceedings were pending and the FIR had resulted from the child's disclosure to a psychiatrist at NIMHANS.

The Supreme Court set aside the approach adopted by the Delhi High Court and the Family Court concerning custody and relocation and permitted the mother, for the present, to take both children to the United Kingdom and enrol them in a good school.

The Court held that the best interests of the children must remain the primary consideration in determining custody.

The Court placed particular emphasis on the principles contained in Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice Act, including participation, best interest, safety and non-waiver of children's rights.

The Court held that the son's disclosure and safety could not be subordinated to the father's claim for custody while the POCSO prosecution remained pending.

The Court stated that once the police had filed a chargesheet concerning allegations constituting a POCSO offence against the father, granting custody to him would be “totally unwarranted and unjustified.”

The Court was particularly concerned that placing the son in the father's custody during the criminal prosecution could seriously compromise the child's ability to give a free and fair deposition in the POCSO proceedings.

The Court therefore held that, while the father continued to face prosecution, he could not be treated as a person entitled to custody of the children in the circumstances before the Court.

The Supreme Court also rejected the Delhi High Court's observations questioning the credibility of the POCSO allegations.

It noted that the FIR had followed a disclosure made by the child to a psychiatrist at NIMHANS and that a chargesheet had subsequently been filed after investigation.

The Court held that the Delhi High Court's observations describing the allegations as motivated and a counterblast were premature, uncalled for and capable of prejudicing the pending criminal proceedings.

Those observations were therefore expunged and directed not to be relied upon in proceedings arising from the POCSO FIR.

The Court clarified that it was not adjudicating the ultimate guilt or innocence of the father in the POCSO case.

The Court also recognised the mother's employment and financial circumstances in the United Kingdom and her ability to arrange suitable schooling and upbringing for the children.

The Court rejected the assumption that relocating the children to the UK would necessarily deprive them of their cultural identity or Bengali roots.

It noted that the mother herself belonged to a Bengali family and could reasonably be expected to preserve the children's cultural and familial connections.

The Court also considered the prolonged litigation and the resulting strain on the children, including the risk of further parental alienation.

The mother was therefore permitted, for the present, to take the children to the United Kingdom and admit them to a good school.

She was directed to place details of the children's schooling on record by affidavit within six weeks and to undertake to produce the children before the Supreme Court or another competent court whenever directed.

The father’s pending quashing petition before the Calcutta High Court was directed to be decided independently and on its own merits, without being influenced by the observations of either the Delhi High Court or the Supreme Court's custody order.

The Court's reasoning is anchored not merely in the existence of an FIR but in the procedural stage reached in the criminal case: investigation had been conducted and a chargesheet had been filed against the father.

The Court nevertheless did not determine whether the allegations were ultimately true. That question remains for the competent criminal proceedings.

This distinction is important because the custody court was not converted into a forum for conducting a trial of the POCSO allegations.

At the same time, the existence of a pending prosecution and the child's disclosure created a sufficiently serious welfare and safety concern to affect the custody determination.

The Court gave particular weight to the possibility that placing the child with the accused parent could affect the child's capacity to participate freely in the criminal prosecution.

The judgment therefore connects custody law with the integrity of pending child-protection proceedings.

The Court's reliance on Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice Act is significant. The principles of participation, best interest, safety and non-waiver collectively require courts to treat the child as an individual rights-holder rather than merely as the object of competing parental claims.

The decision also provides an important caution against making premature credibility findings in parallel custody proceedings.

The Delhi High Court's description of the allegations as motivated or a counterblast was considered inappropriate because the POCSO FIR was already under challenge before another High Court and the police had filed a chargesheet following investigation.

Such observations could potentially prejudice the criminal proceedings, which explains why the Supreme Court expressly expunged them.

The judgment does not establish that every allegation made by a child automatically determines custody. Rather, the Court considered the specific evidentiary and procedural circumstances, including the NIMHANS disclosure, registration of the FIR, filing of the chargesheet, the child's expressed fear and the pending prosecution.

The decision also illustrates that relocation cases cannot be decided through a rigid presumption against international relocation.

The court must assess whether the proposed relocation actually serves the children's welfare, considering factors such as education, financial stability, safety, emotional relationships and the ability to maintain appropriate contact with the other parent.

The mother's employment at the University of Hull and her proposed arrangements for the children's education were relevant to that assessment.

The Court also rejected the assumption that relocation to the UK would necessarily sever the children's cultural identity. Geographic relocation and cultural disconnection are not necessarily synonymous.

Another important aspect is the Court's treatment of the mother's earlier employment movements. Frequent relocation may be relevant in a custody dispute, but it cannot be treated as conclusive proof of parental instability without examining the surrounding circumstances.

The Court also recognised the long duration of the matrimonial and custody litigation and its effect on the children.

The decision is therefore not simply a ruling on which parent should have physical custody; it addresses the interaction among child safety, pending criminal proceedings, parental rights, relocation and the best-interest standard.

The order is also carefully limited. The mother has been permitted to relocate the children for the present, and the appeals remain listed for further hearing in January 2027.

Similarly, the Calcutta High Court remains free to decide the father's quashing petition independently.

Thus, the Supreme Court's custody directions should not be understood as a final adjudication of the father's criminal liability or as a finding that the POCSO allegations have been proved.

The broader principle emerging from the decision is that a parent's custody claim cannot be considered in isolation from credible, ongoing child-protection proceedings where the child's safety and participation in those proceedings may be affected.