Bhaiya Lal Raidas v. State of U.P., 2026

The case arose from an incident in 2011, when an FIR was lodged alleging that the appellant, Bhaiya Lal Raidas, had enticed away the complainant's daughter, who was alleged to be a minor.

The appellant was a married man, and the prosecution alleged that he had taken the prosecutrix away against the wishes of her family.

The prosecutrix underwent a medico-legal examination in May 2011.

An X-ray/radiological examination assessed her age at approximately 18 years.

The doctor who medically examined her stated that she could be approximately 20 years old.

The radiologist assessed her age at about 18 years, with a possible variation of approximately six months on either side.

Despite the medical opinions, the Trial Court independently assessed the prosecutrix's age to be between 14 and 17 years.

The Trial Court relied upon physical characteristics, including the number of teeth and the presence of axillary and pubic hair.

The Trial Court also considered an alleged Class VIII marksheet, which purportedly recorded the prosecutrix's date of birth as 25 September 1993.

The alleged marksheet, however, was not available on the Trial Court's record and had no document number or exhibit mark.

It was also not shown in the index of the record.

The document was not formally proved through the Principal, Headmaster or another competent official of the concerned school.

The Trial Court nevertheless relied upon the alleged date of birth while determining that the prosecutrix was a minor.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 366 IPC and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000.

The appellant was, however, acquitted of the charges under Sections 363 and 376 IPC.

The appellant challenged his conviction before the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court examined whether the prosecution had actually established that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident.

The Court also examined the prosecutrix's statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC.

In those statements, she had stated that she had accompanied the appellant of her own free will and had not made allegations of force or coercion against him.

The High Court noted that she did not disown those earlier statements even while giving evidence before the Trial Court.

The prosecutrix subsequently alleged that the appellant had made her inhale something, causing her to become unconscious.

The High Court examined this subsequent version in light of the surrounding circumstances, including the fact that she allegedly remained with the appellant for approximately seven months.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the criminal appeal filed by Bhaiya Lal Raidas.

The Court set aside the Trial Court's judgment dated 8 February 2013 convicting the appellant under Section 366 IPC.

The High Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident.

The Court placed significant reliance on the medical and radiological evidence concerning her age.

The medical examination indicated an age of approximately 18 years, while the doctor stated that she could be approximately 20 years old.

The radiologist also assessed her age at about 18 years, subject to a margin of variation.

The High Court held that the Trial Court should not have substituted its own assessment for the opinion of the doctor and radiologist.

The Court specifically rejected the Trial Court's reliance on the absence of third molars as proof that the prosecutrix had not attained 18 years.

It held that the absence of third molars is not an essential indicator of minority and cannot by itself establish that a person is below 18.

The Court further held that the mere recording of the presence of axillary and pubic hair did not establish that such hair was not fully developed.

Since the medico-legal report did not state that the hair was insufficiently developed, the Trial Court could not draw its own conclusion regarding age from that physical feature.

The High Court also rejected reliance on the alleged Class VIII marksheet because the document was not part of the Trial Court record, did not bear a document or exhibit number and had not been properly proved.

The Court held that the document could not simply have been produced during examination-in-chief and treated as substantive evidence without following the appropriate procedure for bringing an additional document on record.

The Court further noted that the school authorities had not been examined to prove the authenticity of the alleged marksheet.

The High Court considered the recognised margin of error in radiological age assessment, noting that such assessment may carry a variation of approximately two years on either side.

Accordingly, an assessment of approximately 18 years could not safely establish that the prosecutrix was necessarily below 18 years.

The Court also examined her statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, in which she had stated that she went with the appellant voluntarily.

The Court noted that she did not disown those earlier statements during her subsequent testimony.

The High Court found it difficult to accept the later allegation that she had been rendered unconscious and thereafter transported by the appellant alone from Unnao to Ludhiana.

The Court also took note of the fact that she allegedly remained with the appellant for around seven months without alleging the use of force.

On the cumulative assessment of the evidence, the High Court concluded that the Trial Court's conviction under Section 366 IPC could not be sustained.

The appellant was consequently acquitted.

Burden of proving minority: The judgment underscores the importance of proving the age of the prosecutrix through legally admissible and reliable evidence. Where the prosecution's case depends materially upon minority, uncertainty regarding age can have significant consequences.

Medical opinion cannot be casually displaced: The Court strongly cautioned against a Trial Court assuming the role of a medical specialist. Where qualified doctors and radiologists have assessed age, their expert opinion must be properly considered before a court reaches a contrary conclusion.

Limits of dental age assessment: The Court rejected the proposition that the absence of third molars necessarily means that an individual is below 18. Human biological development varies, and a single physical characteristic cannot automatically establish a legally significant age.

Physical characteristics are not conclusive: The presence of axillary or pubic hair does not, without more, determine whether a person has attained majority. The Court correctly focused on what the medical report actually established rather than what a court might independently assume from general biological knowledge.

Radiological evidence has limitations: Age estimation through X-ray examination is inherently approximate. The Court's reference to a margin of error demonstrates why radiological evidence should be treated as an estimate rather than an exact date of birth.

Documentary evidence must be properly proved: The alleged Class VIII marksheet was particularly problematic. It was not on the record, was not exhibited and was not proved through an appropriate school official. The judgment therefore reinforces the basic evidentiary principle that a document cannot simply be relied upon because it was mentioned or produced during testimony.

Court cannot become a “super-specialist”: One of the strongest observations in the judgment is the Court's warning that a trial judge should not “act as a super-specialist” by substituting personal assumptions for expert medical evidence.

Importance of contemporaneous statements: The High Court gave weight to the prosecutrix's statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, particularly because those statements indicated that she had accompanied the appellant voluntarily and were not subsequently satisfactorily disowned.

Section 366 IPC: The prosecution had to establish the ingredients necessary for the offence charged. The failure to establish the prosecutrix's alleged minority, coupled with the evidentiary circumstances surrounding her departure and stay with the appellant, substantially weakened the prosecution case.

Benefit of evidentiary uncertainty: Criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence concerning a crucial fact such as age remains uncertain, the accused cannot be convicted merely on the basis of speculation or a Trial Court's unsupported biological assessment.

Judicial restraint: The judgment illustrates an important principle of adjudication: courts must evaluate expert evidence critically but should not replace specialised scientific assessment with personal assumptions unsupported by the record.

Significance for age-determination cases: The decision is relevant to criminal cases in which the prosecution's case depends upon establishing that a prosecutrix or victim was below a particular statutory age. Reliable documentary evidence, properly proved medical evidence and legally admissible age-determination material assume particular importance.

Cumulative assessment: The High Court did not base its conclusion solely on one piece of evidence. It considered the medical opinion, radiological assessment, evidentiary defects concerning the marksheet, physical characteristics, the prosecutrix's earlier statements and the surrounding circumstances before concluding that the conviction could not stand.

Important distinction: The judgment does not establish that medical evidence must always prevail over every other form of legally admissible age evidence. Rather, it holds that a court cannot reject qualified medical opinion and substitute its own assessment without a proper evidentiary and legal basis.