Ankush Sehgal v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., 2026

They developed a friendship and subsequently met at Haldwani and visited places including Bhimtal and Hanuman Dham.

According to the FIR, they went to the hotel where the applicant was staying, consumed liquor, and thereafter entered into a physical relationship.

The complainant alleged that the applicant subsequently assured her that he would marry her and that physical relations continued during their relationship.

According to the complaint, the applicant later started avoiding her and allegedly refused to marry her, citing his father's ill health.

The complainant subsequently learned through Instagram that the applicant had become engaged and was going to marry someone else.

She lodged FIR No. 62 of 2021 at Police Station Kathgodam, District Nainital, alleging an offence under Section 376 IPC.

During investigation, statements of the complainant were recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.

The Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet on 4 May 2021, and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, took cognizance and issued the summoning order on 22 September 2021.

Ankush Sehgal approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashing of the charge-sheet, summoning order and entire criminal proceedings. 

Justice Siddhartha Sah examined the FIR as well as the statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. The Court found that the parties had met through Tinder and that the relationship continued for a considerable period, with the parties meeting frequently.

The Court considered the circumstances surrounding the relationship and concluded that the material did not sufficiently demonstrate that the physical relationship had been established pursuant to a false promise of marriage.

The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr. and Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., particularly the distinction between a promise to marry that was false from its inception and a genuine relationship that subsequently fails to result in marriage.

The Court consequently held that continuation of the Section 376 IPC prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Charge-sheet dated 04.05.2021;

Cognizance/summoning order dated 22.09.2021;

Criminal Case No. 4749 of 2021;

Proceedings arising from FIR No. 62/2021;

Proceedings pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani. 

The Court placed significant emphasis on the circumstances indicating that the complainant was an adult who voluntarily entered into the relationship. The FIR and statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were considered together rather than treating the later refusal to marry as automatically negating the earlier consent. 

The Court noted that the parties continued their relationship for a considerable period and met frequently. This conduct was considered relevant to determining whether the relationship was merely based upon a fraudulent promise made at its inception.

The Court did not treat every failed relationship involving sexual intimacy as automatically falling within Section 376 IPC. The allegation of a false promise must be examined against the factual circumstances and the material collected during investigation.

The Court relied upon Biswajyoti Chatterjee and Samadhan, both of which address the distinction between consensual relationships that subsequently fail and relationships involving circumstances that vitiate consent. 

The judgment demonstrates the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to terminate criminal proceedings where the available material does not justify continuation of the prosecution and continuation would amount to abuse of the judicial process.

The judgment reinforces the principle that the courts must examine the nature and circumstances of the promise at the relevant time, rather than treating the subsequent failure to marry as conclusive proof that the original relationship was based upon a false promise. This is a fact-sensitive inquiry and does not establish that every allegation involving a failed relationship must be quashed.

The ruling is based on the particular facts and material before the Court. It should not be understood as holding that allegations involving a false promise of marriage can never constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. The decisive question remains whether the requisite legal ingredients are established on the facts of the individual case.