Ajaib Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2026

The case originated from a gang-rape complaint made by petitioner No. 2.

She alleged that on 19 September 2015, she was forcibly taken by two men on a motorcycle to an empty house at Banur.

According to her original statement, she was made to consume liquor and was subjected to gang rape without her consent by multiple persons.

On the basis of her statement, FIR No. 80 dated 20 September 2015 was registered under Sections 376-D and 342 IPC against Mandeep Singh and four unknown persons.

During investigation, however, the police adopted a different version of events.

The police alleged that petitioner No. 2 had voluntarily accompanied the men and that the sexual relations were consensual and undertaken for consideration.

The investigation further alleged that petitioner No. 2, along with her husband Rakesh Kumar, Mandeep Kaur, Ajaib Singh and Jagtar Singh, had conspired to create a false rape allegation to extort money from the families of the accused persons.

The prosecution relied upon witness statements, video CDs, CCTV footage and call records.

Ajaib Singh was alleged to have demanded ₹4 lakh from the mother of accused Parvinder Singh.

He was further alleged to have received ₹1 lakh from Parvinder Singh's sister and ₹5,000 from Rakesh Kumar.

Petitioner No. 2, who had originally been the complainant, was subsequently made an accused during investigation.

The police presented a challan against her, Ajaib Singh and others under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 384 and 120-B IPC.

Charges under Sections 4 and 5 of the ITP Act, along with Sections 384 and 120-B IPC, were framed against petitioner No. 2.

Ajaib Singh faced a charge under Section 384 IPC.

Their discharge applications were dismissed by the Trial Court, resulting in the present revision petition before the High Court.

The High Court partly allowed the revision petition.

The Court quashed the charges under Sections 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 against petitioner No. 2.

The Court held that Section 4 concerns a person living on the earnings of another woman's or girl's prostitution.

In this case, the prosecution's allegation was that petitioner No. 2 herself participated in prostitution.

There was no allegation that she received, appropriated or depended upon the earnings generated through the prostitution of another woman or girl.

Therefore, the basic ingredient of Section 4 was absent.

The Court also found that Section 5 was not attracted because there was no allegation that petitioner No. 2 procured, induced, took or caused another woman or girl to engage in prostitution.

The Court emphasised that the alleged conduct must satisfy the specific ingredients of the statutory offence.

Merely mentioning a penal provision in the police challan cannot sustain a charge when the alleged facts, even if accepted at face value, do not constitute that offence.

Regarding Ajaib Singh, the Court found specific allegations that he had demanded and received money from family members of the accused persons in the original rape case.

The prosecution also relied upon witness statements and electronic evidence supporting those allegations.

At the charge stage, the Court held that such evidence could not be subjected to a detailed assessment of credibility.

The allegations therefore prima facie disclosed the ingredients of Section 384 IPC against Ajaib Singh.

The Court also maintained the Section 120-B read with Section 384 IPC charge against petitioner No. 2 on the allegation that she acted in connivance with Ajaib Singh and other accused persons.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law.

The judgment reinforces the distinction between participating in prostitution and living on the earnings of another person's prostitution.

This distinction is central to the application of Section 4 of the ITP Act.

The Court made clear that a penal provision cannot be applied unless the prosecution's factual allegations establish its essential ingredients.

Section 5 was also interpreted according to its statutory requirements, which involve conduct directed towards another woman or girl.

The decision prevents the statutory provisions from being applied merely because the investigating agency has mentioned them in the charge-sheet.

The Court distinguished between joint factual allegations and the separate legal requirements of individual offences.

The fact that petitioner No. 2 was originally the complainant did not automatically determine whether the subsequent charges against her were legally sustainable.

However, each charge still had to independently satisfy its statutory ingredients.

The Court maintained the extortion allegation against Ajaib Singh because the prosecution had placed specific allegations regarding demand and receipt of money before the Court.

At the charge-framing stage, the Court considered those materials sufficient to establish a prima facie case, without conducting a mini-trial.

The judgment therefore illustrates the distinction between framing of charges and final determination of guilt.

Evidence such as CCTV footage, call records, witness statements and other electronic material may be considered at the prima facie stage, but their ultimate evidentiary value is a matter for trial.

The decision highlights an important criminal-law principle: every offence must independently satisfy its statutory ingredients.

The ruling is particularly significant for understanding the scope of Sections 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.