Latest JudgementIndian Penal Code, 1860Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. The State (UT of Andaman & Nicobar Islands) Etc., 2026

Appellate Court Must Itself Hear and Impose Sentence After Reversing Acquittal.

Supreme Court of India·28 May 2026

Court

Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision

28 May 2026

Judges

Justice K.V. Viswanathan & Justice Vijay Bishnoi

Citation

Acts / Provisions

Section 386(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) Sections 376, 312, and 417 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

Facts of the Case

The Appellant was tried before the Trial Court in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The charges against the appellant were under:
- Section 376 IPC – Rape
- Section 312 IPC – Causing miscarriage
- Section 417 IPC – Cheating
The Trial Court acquitted the appellant of all charges.
Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State preferred an appeal before the Calcutta High Court, Port Blair Circuit Bench.
The High Court reversed the acquittal and found the accused guilty.
However, instead of imposing the sentence itself, the High Court directed the appellant to surrender before the Trial Court.
The High Court further directed the Trial Judge to hear the accused on sentence and impose the appropriate punishment.
Challenging this procedure, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of India.
The appellant argued that once the Appellate Court convicted the accused, it was the duty of the Appellate Court itself to hear the accused on sentence and impose punishment.
The issue before the Supreme Court primarily concerned the powers of the Appellate Court under Section 386(a) Cr.P.C.

Whether an Appellate Court, after reversing an acquittal and convicting the accused, can remand the matter to the Trial Court only for imposing sentence?
Whether Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. mandates that the Appellate Court itself must hear the accused on sentence after recording conviction?
Whether the High Court committed an error by directing the Trial Court to impose sentence after reversing the acquittal?
Whether hearing on sentence is a mandatory duty of the Appellate Court when conviction is recorded for the first time in appeal?

The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court cannot remand the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of imposing sentence after recording conviction.
The Court observed that under Section 386(a) Cr.P.C., once the Appellate Court finds the accused guilty, it must itself pass the sentence according to law.
The Bench held that the High Court committed a legal error in relegating the matter to the Trial Court for sentencing.
The Court emphasized that the Appellate Court has a bounden duty to hear the convict on sentence.
The Supreme Court clarified that sentencing is an inseparable part of the conviction process when the Appellate Court reverses an acquittal.
The Court relied upon the precedent in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513.
The Court stated that such remand would be contrary to:
- Section 386(a) Cr.P.C.
- Established Supreme Court precedents.
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal.
The impugned order of the High Court was set aside to the extent it remanded the matter for sentencing.
The High Court was directed to itself fix a date and hear the convict on the issue of sentence.

The Supreme Court held that when an Appellate Court reverses an acquittal and convicts an accused, it must itself hear the accused on sentence and impose punishment.
The Appellate Court cannot remand the matter to the Trial Court only for sentencing purposes.
The High Court’s direction remanding the matter for sentencing was held contrary to Section 386(a) Cr.P.C.
The appeal was partly allowed.

The judgment clarifies the scope and responsibility of Appellate Courts under Section 386(a) Cr.P.C.
The ruling reinforces the principle that sentencing is an integral component of conviction.
The Court ensured procedural consistency by preventing fragmented adjudication between appellate and trial courts.
The decision strengthens judicial discipline in criminal appellate jurisdiction.
The judgment prevents unnecessary delay caused by remanding matters solely for sentencing.
The ruling promotes efficiency and finality in criminal appeals.
The Court emphasized that appellate powers include both:
- Conviction
- Sentencing
The judgment protects the procedural rights of the accused by ensuring that the same court hearing the appeal also hears submissions on sentencing.
The decision also reduces duplication of judicial proceedings.
The ruling serves as an important precedent regarding the appellate court’s obligations after overturning acquittals.
The judgment reflects a strict interpretation of statutory powers under criminal procedure law.