Sonu v. State, 2026

An FIR was lodged by the father of the prosecutrix alleging that his 16-year-old daughter had gone missing.

After the prosecutrix returned home, offences under Sections 363, 376, 506 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act were added on the basis of her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC.

The petitioner/accused later married the prosecutrix on 10 July 2024.

A child was born out of the marriage in June 2025.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR and criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement, marital harmony, and welfare of the child.

Reliance was placed on the Delhi High Court judgment in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi).

The State opposed the petition, arguing that:

• The trial had already concluded and only judgment remained to be pronounced.

• A similar quashing petition had earlier been withdrawn without liberty to file afresh.

• The petitioner violated bail conditions restraining him from contacting the prosecutrix and her family.

The State specifically pointed out that the marriage itself took place during the subsistence of the bail restriction order.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the FIR and criminal proceedings.

The Court held that marriage between the accused and prosecutrix does not automatically justify quashing of proceedings under the POCSO Act.

The Court reiterated that offences such as rape and penetrative sexual assault are heinous offences and stand on a different footing from ordinary criminal disputes.

The Court observed that although inherent powers can be exercised even in non-compoundable offences, such powers must be used with great caution in sexual offences involving minors.

The Court relied upon the principles laid down in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) and emphasized the need for careful judicial scrutiny.

The Court held that before quashing such proceedings, it must be determined whether:

• The victim voluntarily supported closure of proceedings;

• The victim consistently opposed prosecution from inception;

• The settlement or marriage was genuine and not intended to evade punishment.

The Court found that the prosecutrix had supported the prosecution both in her Section 164 CrPC statement and in her testimony before the trial court.

The Court observed that the prosecutrix never consistently opposed the prosecution from the beginning.

The Court held that the facts did not establish voluntary conduct on the part of the prosecutrix as required under the principles laid down in Harmeet Singh.

The Court further observed that the marriage prima facie disclosed violation of the bail condition prohibiting contact with the prosecutrix and her family.

The Court concluded that the case did not disclose the “exceptional circumstances” necessary for exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS.

Consequently, the petition for quashing was rejected.

The judgment reinforces the judiciary’s strict approach toward offences involving minors and sexual assault.

The Court balanced the concept of settlement and marital harmony against the broader societal interest in prosecuting serious crimes.

By refusing automatic quashing, the Court emphasized that the POCSO Act is a welfare legislation intended to protect children from exploitation.

The ruling clarifies that marriage cannot be used as a mechanism to dilute criminal liability in serious sexual offences.

The Court relied upon principles developed in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), thereby recognizing limited but cautious judicial discretion in exceptional circumstances.

The judgment underscores that the voluntariness of the prosecutrix is a crucial factor while considering quashing petitions in sexual offences.

The Court gave significant weight to the prosecutrix’s earlier statements supporting prosecution, thereby preserving evidentiary consistency.

The decision also demonstrates judicial intolerance toward violation of bail conditions, particularly where the accused attempts to regularize prohibited contact through marriage.

The ruling strengthens the principle that offences against minors are not merely private disputes but offences against society at large.

The judgment may serve as an important precedent discouraging attempts to use post-offence marriage as a strategy to escape prosecution under the POCSO Act.