Shajiya Parveen and Another v. State of U.P. and 3 Others, 2026

The petition was filed by an inter-faith couple seeking protection of their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners were a 20-year-old Muslim woman and a 19-year-old Hindu man belonging to a Scheduled Caste community.

The couple stated that they were in a live-in relationship and wished to continue cohabiting peacefully.

The petitioners alleged that the woman’s father was threatening them and pressuring them to discontinue their relationship.

The man’s family, however, reportedly had no objection to the relationship.

The petitioners submitted that they were unable to solemnize marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 because the male petitioner had not attained the statutory age of 21 years.

They argued that since both of them were adults, they possessed the autonomy to reside together in a live-in relationship even without marriage.

The State opposed the plea and argued that a male below the age of 21 years would fall within the statutory framework restricting marriage.

It was further argued that since the legislature intentionally fixed the marriageable age for men at 21 years, the Court should not indirectly sanction a “marriage-like relationship.”

The Court examined the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.

The Court observed that all these statutes restrict marriage involving a male who has not attained 21 years of age.

The Court also examined whether Muslim Personal Law could assist the petitioners but found that the petitioners had not solemnized a Nikah and were merely in a live-in arrangement outside marriage.

The Allahabad High Court held that Muslim Personal Law does not recognize or permit a live-in relationship outside marriage merely upon attaining puberty.

The Court observed that even if certain schools of Muslim Personal Law recognize marriage after puberty, such recognition relates only to a valid marriage and not to a non-marital live-in arrangement.

The Court noted that the petitioners themselves admitted that they had not solemnized a Nikah.

The Court held that the petitioners could not rely upon Muslim Personal Law to justify or legalize their live-in relationship.

The Court emphasized that the applicable secular statutes, including the Special Marriage Act, 1954, prescribe a higher threshold regarding marriageable age, which courts are bound to enforce.

The Court observed that what cannot be legally achieved as a valid marriage cannot be judicially reconstructed as a sanctioned live-in relationship.

The High Court further remarked that a live-in relationship is substantially similar to a marriage-like arrangement.

It held that if the law withholds the right to marry until a particular age, the Court cannot indirectly approve a similar arrangement through judicial orders.

The Court clarified, however, that the petitioners retain the right to approach the police authorities if they face threats, harassment, or violence.

The Court directed that if any such complaint is made, the police must act expeditiously in accordance with law.

At the same time, the Court clarified that protection orders cannot restrain parents, guardians, or statutory authorities from taking lawful action permissible under the statutory framework.

Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

The judgment reinforces the primacy of secular statutory law over personal law in matters concerning marriageable age and related legal relationships.

The Court drew a distinction between recognition of marriage under personal law and recognition of non-marital cohabitation arrangements.

The decision reflects judicial reluctance to indirectly validate relationships that could potentially defeat the legislative intent underlying age restrictions in marriage laws.

The Court interpreted live-in relationships as arrangements closely resembling marriage and therefore subject to analogous public policy considerations.

The ruling highlights the judiciary’s attempt to harmonize constitutional protections under Article 21 with statutory limitations imposed by family laws.

The Court adopted a conservative interpretation regarding the legal recognition of live-in relationships involving individuals below the statutory marriageable age.

The judgment clarifies that attaining majority alone does not automatically create enforceable legal recognition for all forms of intimate cohabitation.

The Court balanced personal liberty concerns with the legislative framework governing marriage and family relations.

By permitting the petitioners to seek police protection against threats or violence, the Court acknowledged their constitutional right to safety while declining to legitimize the relationship itself.

The decision may influence future cases involving live-in relationships where one party has not attained the legally prescribed marriageable age.