Bharat Pathak @ Bharat Kumar Pathak v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., 2026

The petitioner joined the Jharkhand Armed Police as a constable in 2007.

A complaint was lodged by a married woman alleging that despite both of them being married and having children, the petitioner had married her, maintained a physical relationship with her between October 2019 and April 2023, and later refused to keep her.

Following a preliminary enquiry, the department initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.

Separately, an FIR was registered against him under Sections 417 and 376(2)(n) IPC.

A departmental charge-sheet alleged that the petitioner had maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman, amounting to indiscipline and bringing disrepute to the police department.

The petitioner was ultimately removed from service under Rule 824(b) of the Police Manual.

His departmental appeal was dismissed.

Before the High Court, the petitioner contended that his dismissal was based upon a ground never included in the charge-sheet, that the disciplinary enquiry suffered from serious procedural defects, and that adultery was no longer a criminal offence after the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.

The High Court held that the dismissal order was illegal because it was founded upon a ground that never formed part of the departmental charge-sheet.

The Court observed that although the departmental charge related to the petitioner's alleged relationship with a married woman, the punishment was ultimately imposed on the basis of the registration of an FIR under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, which was never framed as a disciplinary charge.

It reiterated the settled principle of service jurisprudence that a penalty can be imposed only on the basis of specific charges communicated to the delinquent employee.

The Court held that such action caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and violated the principles of natural justice.

It further found that both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had passed non-speaking orders without properly considering the petitioner's defence.

The Court noted significant deficiencies in the departmental enquiry, observing that apart from the complainant's statement, there was no independent or documentary evidence supporting the allegations.

It recorded that the enquiry itself acknowledged the absence of proof regarding the alleged marriage, lack of CCTV footage, and absence of evidence showing that the petitioner resided with the complainant in the rented accommodation.

Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the Court observed that adultery is no longer a criminal offence and cannot be treated as such in disciplinary proceedings without proper legal justification.

The Court also held that the authorities failed to consider that the complaint had been lodged by a disgruntled complainant and mechanically invoked the concept of moral turpitude without proper application of mind.

Holding that the impugned action was arbitrary, disproportionate, and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the High Court quashed the dismissal order, the consequential order, and the appellate order.

The judgment reinforces the fundamental principle of service jurisprudence that disciplinary punishment must be confined strictly to the charges framed against the employee.

The Court correctly applied the principles of natural justice by holding that an employee cannot be punished on allegations for which no opportunity of defence was provided.

By relying upon Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the Court reaffirmed that adultery has ceased to be a criminal offence, and disciplinary authorities cannot proceed on outdated legal assumptions.

The decision emphasizes the necessity of reasoned (speaking) orders, ensuring transparency and accountability in disciplinary proceedings.

The Court appropriately scrutinized the evidentiary deficiencies, noting the absence of documentary proof, corroborative witnesses, or material evidence supporting the allegations.

The ruling clarifies that registration of an FIR alone cannot automatically become the basis for departmental punishment unless it forms part of the framed charges and is supported by evidence.

The judgment also cautions against the mechanical invocation of moral turpitude, requiring disciplinary authorities to undertake an independent legal assessment before relying upon that concept.

By invoking Articles 14 and 21, the Court strengthened constitutional protections against arbitrary and disproportionate disciplinary action.

The ruling is likely to guide future disciplinary proceedings by emphasizing adherence to due process, fair hearing, and proper appreciation of evidence.

A notable strength of the judgment is its balanced application of constitutional safeguards, service law principles, and procedural fairness, while ensuring that disciplinary authorities remain within the bounds of law.